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LEGISLATING APOLOGY: THE PROS AND CONS
Jonathan R. Cohen'
INTRODUCTION
Should apologies be admissible into evidence as proof of fault in civil
cases? While this question is a simple one, its potential ramifications are
great, and legislative and scholarly interest in the admissibility of
apologies has exploded. Shortly after the idea of excluding apologies
from admissibility into evidence was raised in academic circles three
years ago,' it rapidly spread to the policy arena.' For example,
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I. The idea of excluding apologies from admissibility into evidence was independently and
contemporaneously raised by Aviva Orenstein and myself. See Aviva Orenstein,Apology Ecepted: Incotporating
A Feminist Analysis Into Evidence Polie I lVhere ou I Vould Least E'pec It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221,237-55 (1999);
Jonathan R. Cohen,Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. RE-;. 1009, 1061-64 (1999) [hereinafter Cohen,
Advising]; Jonathan R. Cohen,..\a ging oblem: Advising the client who wants to apologize, DISP. RESOL. NAG.,
Spring 1999, at 19. The strongest critique of legislative revision is Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodifiration of Apology, 109 YALE Lj. 1135, 1151-54 (2000). For a recent evaluation of that debate
generally supportive of revision, see Elizabeth Latif, Apologeticjustice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Towmad Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 301-02, 308-10, 316-20 (2001). See also William K. Bartels, Recent
Developments, The Story Sea ofApologies: California Evidence Code Section 1160 Avovides a Safe Harborfor Apologies
Made Ajer'Accidents, 28 W. ST. U. L. REv. 141 (2000/2001)(analyzing California's recent legislation).
There has been much fine legal scholarship addressed to other aspects of apology. Several notable works
are Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United
States, 20 L. & SOc'y REv. 461 (1986); Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Saying rou're Sony, 3 NEGOTIATIONJ. 221
(1987); Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences ofApologizing, 1996J. DiSP. RE.SOl.. 115 (1996);
Deborah L. Levi, The Rok of Apology in Alediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1997); MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AvrER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE
112-17 (1998); David A. Hoffman, The UVse of Apology in Employment Cases, I PRAC. Disp. RESOL. 1(1999);
Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: EsploringAn Evample From Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 1447 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Apology]; Daniel W. Shuman, The Rok of Apology in Tnt Law, 83
JUDICATURE 180 (2000); Carl D. Schneider, I1hat It Means to Be Sony: The Power of Apology in Mediation,
MEDIATION Q., Spring 2000, at 265; Max Bolstad, Learningfrom lapan: The Casefor Increased Use of Apology
in Mediation, 48 CL.v. ST. L. REV. 545 (2000); CarrieJ. Petrucci, Apology in the CnminatJustice Setting. Evidence
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California and Florida enacted laws in 2000 and 2001 respectively
excluding from admissibility apologetic expressions of sympathy ("I'm
sorry that you are hurt") but not fault-admitting apologies ("I'm sorry
that I injured you") after accidents.3 Eight states are now considering
pending apology bills,4 and other states likely will follow?
Though such bills may at first appear mere modifications of the states'
evidence codes, such "mere modifications" may indeed be
revolutionary. Apologies can be central elements in preventing and
settling lawsuits.6 Yet apologies are often not offered after injuries, in
part from the fear of liability. Thus, rules barring apologies from
admissibility, in particular rules excluding fault-admitting apologies,
have the potential to dramatically alter dispute resolution and legal
practice.' Such bills also raise many questions. If apologies are to be
excluded from admissibility, why draw the line where states like
California and Florida have in excluding apologetic expressions of
sympathy and benevolence after accidents? Would it be better to
exclude full, fault-admitting apologies? And what ofintentional injuries?
Are not apologies needed in such cases too?
'The goal of this Article is to present the pros and cons of such
legislation, that is, policy arguments that can be made supporting and
opposing such legislation. As with most issues of substance, sound
of Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System, BEHAV. SCI. & L. (forthcoming). Also of
relevance is apology's sometimes-reciprocating counterpart, forgiveness. SeeJEFFRIE G. MURPHY &JEAN
HAMI'rON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 112-17 (1998); DIIENSIONS
OF FORGIVENESS: PSYCHOI.OGICAL RESEARCH AND THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Everett L.
Worthington,Jr., ed., 1998); Daniel W. Shuman & Alexander McCall Smith, Forgiving the Past. Resentment
and Morality, inJUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES 39-34 (2000).
2. The bridge from the ivory tower to California's legislative floor came by way of Steven Keeva's
fine article, Does Law Alean .\ver Having to Say You're Sony?, 83 A.B.A.J. 64 (1999). California Superior Court
Judge Quentin L. Kopp, inspired by Keeva's article, prompted California's legislation. See Mark Hansen,
Vs HardFeelings: California Bill I 'ould Let People Apologize Afler Accidents I Vithout Setting Themveo.s Lp j Civil Suit.;
86 A.B.A.J. 28 (2000). See also Richard C. Reuben, States Stmnling to Offer Legal Protection for Apology, DISP.
RESOL. MAIG., Summer 2000, at 30. California's law excluding apologetic expressions of sympathy drew
upon similar bills previously passed in Massachusetts (1986) and Texas (1999). See infia Part I. However, to
the best of my knowledge, the widespread discussion of such bills as apology legislation arose with Keeva's
article and California's law.
3. See infia Part I.
4. Id.
3. See Editoria" The Role ofApology, 163 NJ.LJ. 178 n.3. ("[%,I]e should consider re-writing the rules
orevidence to exclude some apologies from the admissions-by-a-party-opponent doctrine."). The debate
concerning the interaction between apology and the legal system has reached Canada as well. See, e.g., Susan
Alter, Apologizing For Serious I lrongdoing: Social, Psychological and Legal Coniderations (Final Report for the Law
Commission of Canada, May 1999); Frances Backhouse, Sorly Seems to be the Hardest I Vord, 10THENAT'L 28
(June-July 2001).
6. See generally Cohen, Advisin, supra note 1.
7. See infra Parts Ill, IV.
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arguments exist on both sides. While I have supported the effort to
advance such legislation,8 and while my proclivity toward such
legislation may occasionally show through, my purpose here is not that
of advocacy but of analysis. I present what I see as the best arguments
for and against such legislation and leave it to others to judge the merits
of those arguments. I do this for two reasons. First, to the best of my
knowledge, the arguments supporting and opposing such legislation, as
well as the areas of uncertainty concerning such legislation, have not
been systematically presented. I hope that this Article may assist those
assessing pending legislation or drafting future legislation. Second is the
matter of scholarly interest. Although the initial question of whether
apologies should be admissible into evidence as proof of fault in civil
cases is simple, it implicates a fascinating array of legal, ethical,
psychological, economic, and even cross-cultural issues. Consider a few
representative questions. (Law) How would an apology exclusion
compare to existing evidentiary exclusions for subsequent remedial
measures, statements made during settlement negotiations, or
confessional statements made to clergy under the priest-penitent
privilege? (Ethics) If an injurer is truly sorry, why shouldn't his apology
be used against him in court? Doesn't being sorry mean taking
responsibility, including paying, for what he has done? (Psychology)
How does an apology, or the lack of an apology, affect the injured and
the injurer? (Economics) While doctors who make mistakes often don't
apologize for fear that the apology will be used against them to prove
liability, many patients who sue their doctors say they would not have
sued if only the doctor had apologized. Could excluding apologies from
admissibility help avoid this vicious cycle? (Cross-cultural studies) In
Japan, apologies after injuries are highly typical and lawsuits highly
atypical. Could the United States emulate theJapanese approach? This
Article does not aim to fully resolve these specific questions. Rather, I
hope the reader will gain a taste of the interdisciplinary issues involved.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief background
on existing evidentiary rules and pending legislation related to apology.
Part II explores through dialogism the pros and cons of laws excluding
apologetic expressions of sympathy, but not fault-admitting apologies,
from evidence to prove liability. Part III examines laws that would
exclude fault-admitting apologies following either unintentional or
intentional injuries. Part IV presents questions for future research.
8. See, for example, my remarks praising California's law for excluding apologetic expressions of
s)mpathy but critiquing it for not also excluding fault-admitting apologies in Hansen,supra note 2.
2002]
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A few words on this Article's scope may be in order at the outset.
This Article examines apology legislation in the civil, rather than the
criminal, setting.9 This is not to say that apology has no place in
criminal cases. Apology's potential within the criminal setting may well
exceed that within the civil setting. From the viewpoints of morality and
psychology, the more serious the harm, the greater is the need for an
apology. Further, while apologies have long influenced criminal
sentencing, 10 the use of apology in ordinary criminal cases appears to be
growing both domestically and internationally," particularly within
victim-offender mediation programs. 2 Apology is even playing an
increasing role in responding to gross human rights violations.
(Compare the recent approach of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, where amnesty was granted upon a full
confession, with the prosecutorial model of the Nuremberg a half-
9. For a line sociological analysis of the use and potential of apologies in the criminal setting, see
Petrucci, supra note I.
10. Apologies have long had their place within the formal criminal system, where following
conviction but prior to sentencing, defendants often apologize. Some criminal sentencing guidelines
explicitly make the defendant's remorse a factor for consideration. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 3E 1.1 (Law.
Co-op. 2000) ("If tile defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, [his
sentence shall be decreased by two levels.]"). Such remorse, however, must be perceived to be sincere. See,
e.g., United States v. Camargo, 908 F.2d 179, 185 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying sentence reduction where
defendant's apology was "a calculated simulation of remorse"). Seegenerl/y ROGER W. HAINES,JR. ET AL,
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDEIJNES HANDBOOK 839 n.603 (2000). The widespread practice of plea
bargaining also involves an admission of fault, though not necessarily an expression of remorse, by the
defendant.
11. On the growth of victim-offender mediation programs (VOMPs) internationally, see MARK S.
UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION: AN ESSEN-rIALGUIDETO PRACTICEAND
R SEARCH, at xl\ (2001) (describing over 1300 programs in seventeen countries), 179-93 (focusing on the
U.S., Canada, and England). See also RESTORATIVEJUSTICE: PHILOSOPHYTO PRACTICE (Heather Strang
& John Braithwaite eds., 2000) (analyzing particularly New Zealand's extensive experience); David B.
Moore, Shame, Fwogiveness andjtuvenile Justice, 12 CRIM.JUST. ETHICS 3, 6 (Winter/Spring 1993); Carol
LtPrairie, Developments in Criminal law and Criminal Jutice: Canferencing in Abonkinal Communities in Canada:
Finding Aliddle Ground in ciminalJustice?, 6 CRIM. L.F. 576,384 (1995) (same for aboriginal communities in
Canada). For a philosophical analysis of apology within the restorative criminal settings, see R.A. DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COmmUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 92-96, 103-15 (2001).
12. For an overviewr of VONPs, se generally MA[.RKS. UMIBREIT, VICTIM .NIEETSOFFENDER: THE
IMPACT OF RESTORATIVEJUSIICE ANI) MEDIATION; UMIBREIT, supra note II. Apologies are often
centerpieces of such mediations. In a study of VOMPs in four American cities, Umbreit found that 700/s of
victims considered receiving an apology an impormnt issue before the mediation, and 78% after the
mediation. This was higher than the percentages, 66% and 7 1% respectively, for those who considered
receiving restitution an important issue. Offenders too (8 8 % pre-mediation and 890 post-mediation) felt
apologizing to the victim was an important issue. U.MIBREIT, supra, at 72-73. For a critique of VOMPs, see
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Focedural Critique, 43 EMORY LJ.
1247 (1994). While VOMPs commonly handle minor crimes, often by youths, they have been applied in
cases as extreme as murder. For a powerful documentary of an apology by a convicted murderer to the
victim's mother within a VONIP, see 48 Hours: My Daughter's Killr (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1999).
See also Schneider, supra note I, at 27 1-73 (describing the apology within a VOMP by an attacker to the man
he shot and seriously wounded).
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century ago.)" s However, this Article focuses on the civil setting. There
are several reasons for this. Both the existing and the proposed
legislation address only the civil setting. This is in contrast to most
American evidence law which draws no distinction between civil and
criminal cases.'" Further, criminal charges are brought by the state
rather than the injured person. If the offender apologizes to the injured
party in a civil case, this means that the defendant has apologized to the
plaintiff. In a criminal case, that correspondence is severed. Criminal
cases also present a risk of coerced confessions. As reflected in the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, constitutional law has long
been wary of the potential for the state to abuse its power and coerce
confessions, both false and true.'5 Civil cases typically pose little risk
that a plaintiff could coerce a confession from the defendant. In the
criminal setting, where the state arrests, prosecutes and incarcerates,
that risk is quite real.
This Article also does not address public, political apologies that have
recently mushroomed in which the state or other entity apologizes for
some past or current wrong, such as the United States's apology for the
internment ofJapanese Americans, Pope John Paul II's apologies for
various sins committed by the Catholics over the past millennium, the
Chinese government's demand that the U.S. government apologize
following a recent air collision off Chinese waters, and African-
American calls for an apology for slavery.' 6 Although the rise of such
13. See MINOW, suptsa note I, at chs. 3, 4.
14. Though particular rules of evidence differentiate between civil and criminal cases (see, e.g., FED.
R. E\ID. 412(a), (b)), most rules ofevidence do not distinguish between these settings. Contrast this with the
bifurcated FEDERALRULFS OFCRIMINAL. PROCEDURE and the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE or
the separation between American criminal and civil law generally.
15. AsJustice Frankfurter expressed, involuntary confessions are excluded,
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract
them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt
by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge
against an accused out of his own mouth.
Rogers v. Richmond, 363 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). See generally CHARLES TILFORD NICCOR.IICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, at ch. 13 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999).
16. On the rise of such public, political apologies nationally and internationally, see generally Eric
K. Yamamoto, RaceApologies, I J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 47(1997). See also M INOW, supra note l,at 91-117;
RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 264-67 (1998); Mark Gibney & David
Warner, What Does It Mean to Say I'm Sony? h-esident Clinton's Apology to Guatemala and Its Significance for
International and Domestic law, 28 DENV.J. INT'L L. & POI'Y 2, 223 (2000). Also ofrelevance to such cultural
transitions are JAMES B. TWITCHELL, FOR SHAME: THE Loss OF COMMON DECENCY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1997); PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN L.\\W AND
LITERATURE (2000). Regarding specific apologies, see, for example, ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE,
RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THEJAPANESE AM IERICAN | VI'ERN.M lENT 399-401 (2001) (noting the
United States's apology for Japanese American internment); LUIGi ACCAITou, WHEN A POPE ASKS
2002] 823
824 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA 7 LA W REVIEW [Vol. 70
public, political apologies and the rise of apology legislation for
"ordinary" civil cases discussed here may not be coincidental, such
public, political apologies implicate distinct issues.
As this new apology legislation may generate major changes in
dispute resolution and legal practice, fully evaluating its evolution and
impact must ultimately await history's judgment. How these laws will
develop and what social changes they will produce is uncertain. This
does not mean that the pros and cons of these new laws should not be
considered at the time of their making. Rather we must be mindful of
the uncertainties inherent in such assessments, the greatest of which may
be ones that we do not now appreciate. It may take several decades, if
not longer, before the impact of such legislation is thoroughly
understood.
I. A BRIEF LEGAL BACKDROP
Under existing American law, (fault-admitting) apologies are
ordinarily admissible to prove liability.'7 Rule 801 (d)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) and analogous state provisions provide that an
admission by a party-opponent is "not hearsay" and hence not excluded
from admissibility by the hearsay rule. 8 Rule 801 (d)(2) defines an
admission by a party-opponent as, among other things, "the party's own
statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity."' 9
Hence, even though an apology would fit the classical definition of
hearsay as "[an out of court statement] ... offered in evidence to prove
FORGIVENESS: THE MEA CULPA'S OFJOHN PAUL 11 (Jordan Aumann trans., 1998) (describing Catholic
Church's various apologies); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Reaction in China: Beijing Declaes Victory but Chat Rooms ire
Skeptical, N.Y. TIM.ES, Apr. 13, 2001, at A I I (describing U.S.-China incident); RN.XDALL ROBINSON, THE
DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OwFS TO BLAcKS 201-34 (2000) (demanding reparations, including an apology,
for slavery).
17. There are many ways ofdefining the term "apology." For the purposes of this article, I will use
a definition I offered earlier, namely, that an apology is "an admission of one's fault combined with an
expression of regret for having injured another as well as an expression of sympathy for the other's injury."
Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1015 (emphasis omitted). No definition ofapology is perfect, in part because
apologies vary considerably. For assorted definitions, see Rehm & Beatty,supra note 1, at 116; Orenstein,
supra note I, at 239; Petrucci, supra note I, at 7.
18. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
19. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) provides in part:
A statement is not hearsay if ... [tihe statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an indikidual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship[.]
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the truth of the matter asserted, 2 ° the Federal Rules treat it as non-
hearsay. Observe that the reason an apology counts as an admission by
a party-opponent rests not in the fact that when apologizing one admits
one's fault, but rather that, when apologizing, one is making a
statement." The term "admission" in the phrase "admission by a party-
opponent" might more accurately be read as "statement," as FRE
801 (d)(2) permits the introduction of many statements which are not
themselves admissions of fault. 2
In civil cases, there are two exclusionary rules that might preclude a
fault-admitting apology from admissibility. First is the possibility that
the apology was made during mediation. Rule 501 provides that, "[I] n
civil actions and proceedings... the privilege of a witness, person, [and
other entities] shall be determined in accordance with State law. 23
Accordingly, where statements made in the course of mediation are
privileged under state law, they can be excluded from admissibility.
Second is the possibility that the apology was made during settlement
negotiations.24  Rule 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise")
provides in part, "Evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is... not admissible [to prove liability for or
20. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2 I. Some cases present additional grounds for the admissibility ofan apology besides the admission
by a party-opponcnt doctrine. For example, an apology, offered shortly after an accident "while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the [accident]" could fit he excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EViD. 803(2). More commonly, an apology might be admissible
under the exception for declarations or statements igainst interest under Rule 804(b)(3). However, Rule
804(b)(3) applies only where the declarant is "unavailable asa witness," where the statement was "at the time
of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that
a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true[,j" and where the declarant has personal knowledge of the facts alleged. &e FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3);
MCCORMICK, supa note 13, § 316, at 318. Hence, there are many cases where an apology would be
admissible as an admission by a party-opponent, but not as a statement against interest. Seldom are
witnesses, especially party-witnesses, "unavailable" in civil cases within the meaning of 804(b)(3). See
MICCORMICK, supra note 13, § 316, at 316.
Even if the witness is unavailable, one may question whether the prior apology was sufficiently
against the declarant's interests to fall within FRE 804(b)(3). Might the declarant have apologized not
because he believed himself at fault but simply to "smooth things over" and avoid future conflict? Such a
statement might have been made with the intent of self-benefit, lacking the veracity guaranty presumed by
the "against interest" exception. WVhere an organization apologizes through a representative without first-
hand knowledge; the apology would be admissible as an admission by a party-opponent but not as a
statement against interest. This Article focuses on the admission by t party-opponent exception, for this casts
the broadest net for the admissibility ofan apology. See also Orenstein, sunpa note I, at 223.
22. See MICCORMICK, supra note 13, § 254, at 138 ("An admission does not need to have the dramatic
effect or to be the all-encompassing acknowledgment of responsibility that the word confession connotes.
Admissions are simply words or actions inconsistent with the party's position at trial...").
23. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
24. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1032-36.
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invalidity of a claim or its amount]."25 The basic rationale behind this
rule is the "promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and
settlements of disputes."26 Hence, an apology made during settlement
negotiations generally should not be admissible to prove liability.27
There are, however, significant requirements to the rule, including the
fact the apology must be made during and not before settlement
negotiations and that the apology can be introduced for a variety of
other purposes, including at times impeachment.2 Hence, the offender
who apologized during settlement negotiations but then denied his fault
at trial faces such a risk.29
Several other rules of evidence deserve mention, not because in their
existing forms they would exclude an apology, but because they provide
further context for understanding where an apology exclusion would fit
within the evidence rules. Rule 407 ("Subsequent Remedial Measures")
provides in part, "When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to proved negligence[.] "30 The reasoning behind this
rule is straightforward. As the advisory committee notes state, "The
[best] ground for exclusion [of subsequent remedial measures] rests on
a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging
them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety."'', Along similar
lines, FRE 409 ("Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses") provides,
"Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical,
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible
to prove liability for the injury." 2 The rationale given for this rule is
that "such payment or offer is usually made from humane impulses and
not from an admission of liability, and that to hold otherwise would tend
23. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
26. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee notes (citing NICCORMICK,supra note 15, at §§ 76, 251).
27. Some might query whether, where a party admits his fault within an apology, the claim may be
judged "disputed" for the purposes of FRE 408. See, e.g., ARTHUR BFST1, EVIDENCE: EA.MPLE.S &
ENPL\NNTIONS 22-23 (4th ed. 200 1) ("The proponent of IRule 408's] application must show that there was
a disputed claim. This means that Rule 408 does not prevent the admission ofan offer ofpayment like, 'I
know I made a mistake and there's about S300 worth ofdamage to your car, but I'll only pay S200.' Those
words admit responsibility and also concede the amount of harm caused."). Rule 408 applies where either
the validity oi the amount ofthe claim is disputed. See FED. R. EVID. 408. Accordingly, iFtduring settlement
negotiations one admits one's fault in an apology but the extent ofdamages or compensation has yet to be
determined, FRE 408's protection should still apply.
28. See Cohen, Adiing, supra note I, at 1034-35.
29. 1 know of no cases where this has occurred. The risk, however, is real.
30. FED. R. EvID. 407.
31. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee notes.
32. FED. R. ENID. 409.
826
LEGISLA TING APOLOGY
to discourage assistance to the injured person."3 Also of relevance is
FRE 410 ("Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements") which provides that prior guilty pleas which were later
withdrawn, prior pleas of nolo contendere, and prior statements made
in plea discussions cannot be used in most civil and criminal
proceedings.14 Noteworthy too, is the ancient priest-penitent privilege
adopted in different forms by all fifty states, which paradigmatically
excludes a confession made by a person to his or her clergyperson. ' '
Against this backdrop, let us now turn to the fairly recent
development of apology laws implicating apology in civil cases. This
development begins not with bills that would exclude full, fault-admitting
apologies from evidence, but rather with bills that exclude expressions
of sympathy and benevolence.
In 1986, Massachusetts became the first state to exclude expressions
of sympathy and benevolence after accidents from admissibility to prove
liability. Massachusetts General Laws ch. 233, Section 23D
("Admissibility of Benevolent Statements, Writings, or Gestures Related
to Accident Victims") provides, "Statements, writings or benevolent
gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating
to the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an accident and
made to such person or to the family of such person shall be
inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action. ' 36
This law's genesis is poignant. As Lee Taft describes:
In the 1970s a Massachusetts legislator's daughter was killed while
riding her bicycle. The driver who struck her never apologized. Her
father, a state senator, was angry that the driver had not expressed
contrition. He was told that the driver dared not risk apologizing,
because it could have constituted an admission in the litigation
surrounding the girl's death. Upon his retirement, the senator and his
successor presented the legislature with a bill designed to create a "safe
harbor" for would-be apologizors. 7
One issue the Massachusetts law left unresolved was the scope of
"[s] tatements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or
a general sense of benevolence." 8 No doubt these categories would
cover a statement by the injurer such as, "I hope you feel better soon."
33. FED. R. EVID. 409 advison committee notes.
34. FED. R. EVID. 410.
33. See infia Part IlI.
36. MASS. GEN. LA\VS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West Group 2001, WESTLAW current through c. 122
of the 2001 First Annual Sess. ofGen. Court).
37. Taft, apra note I,at 1131.
38. Supra text accompanying note 36.
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But would they also cover statements such as, "I'm sorry that you are
hurt" or even "I'm sorry that I hurt you?" Put differently, what would
happen if a statement of fault were embedded within an expression of
sympathy or benevolence? The law was silent on that issue.
39
Texas was the next state to adopt legislation, and it explicitly resolved
the ambiguity present in the Massachusetts statute.40  Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code § 18.061 ("Communications of Sympathy")
made inadmissible a "communication" that "expresses sympathy or a
general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of
an individual involved in an accident[.]"4 1  It defined a
"communication" as a statement, writing, or gesture that conveys a
sense of "compassion or commiseration emanating from humane
impulses. '42 These parts were virtually identical to the Massachusetts
law. Yet Texas's law, passed in 1999, went further. Texas's law also
provided that, "a communication, including an excited utterance...
which also includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or
culpable conduct pertaining to an accident or event, is admissible to
prove liability[.] 4 3 Expressions of sympathy or benevolence after an
39. My research has found no Massachusetts case addressing that issue.
40. Georgia has case law to a similar effect. See Deese v. Carroll City Cty. Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 127,
129 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that a trialjudge's exclusion ofdefendant's sympathetic and benevolent
gestures was not an abuse of discretion as, "activity constituting a voluntary offer of assistance made on the
impulse of benevolence or sympathy should be encouraged and should not be considered as an admission
of liability."). The impulse to encourage not only expressions of sympathy and benevolence but also fault-
admitting apologies can be found in case law too, both concerning mitigating darmages, see, for example,
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 306 n. 1 (1972) ("[m]odification of contempt penalties is common shere
the contemnor apologizes"), and establishing fault. See Senesitc v. Assocs. in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 449
A.2d 900, 903 (Vt. 1982) (holding a physician's fault-admitting apology insufficient to establish medical
negligence); Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849,849 (Vt. 1992) (same). On the sympathy ofjudges and juries
toward apologizers, see Rehm & Beatty, supia note 1, at 122-26. Such pro-apologizer sentiment has also
been shown in some psychological studies. See Bruce W. Darby & Barn, R. Schlenker, Chitens Reaction" to
Apoloqies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Balrry R. Schlenker,
Children's Reactions to Transgressions: gffecv of the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remose, 28 BRITISHJ. OF SOC.
PSYCHOL. 353 (1989) (noting that children tend to assess individuals who apologize for transgressions more
positively than individuals who fail to apologize).
41. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West Group 2001, WVESTLAW current through
end of 2001 Reg. Sess.).
42. Id.
43. Id. Texas's mention of an excited utterance raises the issue of the apology offered soon after the
injury, while the injurer was "under the stress of excitement" caused by the accident. See TcN. R. EVID..§
803(2). It is interesting that the drafters of Texas's law deemed that scenario worth mentioning explicitly,
for without the phrase "including an excited utterance," an apology which constituted an excited utterance
would have still been admissible either under § 18.061 or under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule, making the phrase "including an excited utterance" in § 18.061 superfluous. Such language
may point to the idea of limiting the exemption of fault-admitting apologies only to those offered
spontaneously after the accident. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1063.
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accident would be excluded from evidence, but not embedded
admissions of fault.
In 2000, California became the next state to pass such legislation. Its
statute ("Statement of Benevolence") was virtually identical to that of
Texas:
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain,
suffering, or death of a person involved in an accident and made to
that person or to the family of that person shall be inadmissible as
evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action. A statement of
fault, however, which is part of, or in addition to, any of the above
shall not be inadmissible pursuant to this section.'
Noteworthy too is a hypothetical example provided by the California
Senate Judiciary Committee to the California legislature to assist in
understanding the statute's parameters:
An accident occurs and one driver says to the other: 'I'm sorry you
were hurt, the accident was all my fault.'-or--'I'm sorry you were
hurt, I was using my cell phone and just didn't see you coming.'
Under the bill, only the portions of the statements containing the
apology would be inadmissible; any other expression acknowledging
or implying fault would continue to be admissible, consistent with
present evidentiary standards. '
Under the Judiciary Committee's highly plausible interpretation of
California's law, in the above hypothetical, the phrase, "I'm sorry that
you were hurt" would be inadmissible, but the phrases "the accident was
all my fault" and "I was using my cell phone and just didn't see you
coming" would be admissible. Consider another hypothetical. What if
instead of saying, "I'm sorry that you were hurt" (which is inadmissible),
the driver had said, "I'm sorry that I hurt you"? Now the statement, or
at least the last three words of it containing the admission of fault, would
be admissible.' Slight linguistic changes could have dramatic legal
44. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (LEXIS through 2001 Sess.).
43. Rep. No. 6-1 Bill Analysis Submitted to SenateJudiciar, Comm., Hearing DatcJune 20, 2000.
46. Ironically. California's law might appear to preclude the defendant who wants to offer the
beginning of the statement (i.e., "I'm sorry that") to provide the context for the admission of fault from so
doing, that is, the plaintiff might introduce the fragment of the sentence that admits fault, but the defendant
could not introduce the fragment that shows it was an apology. Surely the better approach is to follow the
completeness doctrine and hold that, if the inculpatory piece of the apology is admissible, then the
introductory expression of regret ("I'm sorry about that...") should also be admissible. See CAL. E'ID. CODE
§ 336 ("Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the
whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the adverse pary... ); FED. R. EVID. 106 ("When a
writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
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consequences based upon the precise content of the statement. "I'm
sorry that you are hurt" does not include an admission of fault, whereas
"I'm sorry that I hurt you" does.47
In 2001, Florida enacted legislation virtually identical to
California's, and six other states now have similar pending legislation.48
Four of these bills (in Illinois, Iowa, Rhode Island, and Tennessee) follow
the Texas/California/Florida pattern of excluding expressions of
benevolence and sympathy following accidents but expressly providing
that admissions of fault contained within such expressions are
admissible. Like Massachusetts's earlier law, two of them (Rhode Island
and West Virginia) remain silent on the issue of an admission of fault
embedded within an apology. To date, no law has been enacted
excluding a fault-admitting apology. '9 Yet two states, Connecticut and
Hawaii, have pending bills that, if enacted, would appear to take that
step.
Before turning to the Connecticut and Hawaii bills, it is worth
observing how the recently enacted laws in Texas, California, and
Florida were depicted in the media. These laws specifically excluded
only expressions of sympathy and benevolence and not admissions of
fault contained within such expressions. Yet they were publicly
presented as "apology" statutes that allowed people to "say they were
sorry" after an accident.50 While some, but not all, of the news accounts
were technically accurate in their details, a sampling of headlines is
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness
to be considered contemporaneously with it.").
47. From the viewpoint of legal relevance, both the statement, "I'm sorry that you are hurt" and the
statement, "I'm sorry that I hurt you" are relevant on the issue ofault, though ofcourse the latter has much
greater probative value than the former. With either statement, the chain of inference runs from the
statement, to the declarant's subjective beliefabout his fault, to the defendant's actual fault. As a person who
is actually at fault is more likely to say "I'm sorry that you are hurt" than one who is not actually at fault, that
declaration too has logical relevance regarding fault. See also injia note 67.
48. See FI\. STAT. § 90.4026 (2001). See also 2001 Bill Text IL S.B. 439 (version Feb. 20, 2001)
(Illinois); 2001 Bill Text IA S.S.B. 1071 (versionJan. 31,2001) (iowa); 2001 Bill Text RI H.B. 6905 (version
Jan. 23, 2002) (Rhode Island); 2001 Bill Text TN H.B. 2185 (versionJan. 17, 2002) (Tennessee); 2001 Bill
Text WA S.B. 6429 (versionJan. 17, 2002) (Washington); 2001 Bill Text WV S.B. 587 (version Mar. 26,
200 1) (West Virginia).
49. The argument might be advanced that an admission of fault contained within an expression of
sympathy could be excluded under Massachusetts's law and Rhode Island and West Virginia's pending bills,
for they do not explicitly provide for the admissibility ofsuch statements. However, given the long history
of the admissions doctrine, I would not place much stock in that argument.
50. Consider too the title of W\est Virginia's proposed bill ("Certain Apologies Admissible"). See 2001
Bill Text WV S.B. 587 (version Mar. 26, 2001) (West Virginia). Although this bill would exempt only
statements expressing "sympathy or a general sense of benevolence," the word "apology" is used in the title
of the statute. Such "mislabeling" in the title is not present in the laws enacted in Massachusetts, Texas,
California, and Florida, nor in the bills pending in Illinois, Iowa, Rhode Island, Tennessee, or Washington.
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indicative of how these laws were presented: "Sorry's Safe Now,"' 1
"Accident Can Mean Saying You're Sorry in California, Apology is No
Longer Evidence of Liability," "No Hard Feelings: California bill would
let people apologize after accidents without setting themselves up for
civil SuitS." '52 It is perhaps unsurprising that the Texas and California
laws received virtually unanimous support within their legislatures.53
Though publicly presented as "apology" laws, the substantive changes
these laws made to the evidence codes was comparatively minor. As a
statement which merely expresses sympathy or benevolence after an
injury has little probative value on the issue of fault, precluding juries
from hearing such expressions was not a major change in trial practice.
This may help explain the overwhelmingly favorable votes these laws
received: If these laws made major legal changes, even if their overall
effects were positive, no doubt some adversely affected interest group
would have opposed them.
Now let us consider the Connecticut and Hawaii bills. Connecticut's
proposed bill ("An Act Concerning Statements of Apology Made after
an Accident") would provide that apologies could not be used to prove
culpability. The bill's stated purpose is, "[t]o make statements of
apology to injured person[s] or families inadmissible in court[.] ''55 It
provides:
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury
or wrongful death ... in which it is alleged that such injury or death
resulted from the negligence of a party, the use of an expression of
apology, whether oral or written, by such party shall not be admissible
in evidence to establish culpability or state of mind.56
While this bill does not explicitly state that an admission of fault
contained within an apology would be inadmissible, this appears to be
the most plausible, but not an indisputable, reading of the bill. (The
potential ambiguity rests in how broadly the term "apology," which is
3I. Seet espectivelvAUSTlNA.Nl.-S'rATFS.XN,July 2, 1999, at AI4; USA ToDAY, Feb. 3, 2001, at A];
Hansen, suprat note 2, at 28; Sr. PETERSBURG TIFiES, Feb. 28, 2001, at 16A.
52. Hansen, supa note 2, at 28.
53. The California Assembly voted 75 to 0 in favor of the law, and the California Senate 27 to 1.
Seehttp://wwwss .leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-OO/bill/asm/ab_2801-2830/ab-2804_bill_20000724_history.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2001). Though no record was taken of the Texas House vote, Texas's law passed its
Senate 30 to 0. See e-mail from Douglas Dunsavage, Legislative Aide to State Representative Patricia Gray,
to Kathleen Loftus (Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Author). There was no role call taken of the vote on the
Massachusetts law. Telephone Inteview by Kathleen Loftus with Naomi Allen, Research Librarian,
Massachusetts State Library (Aug. 24,200 1). To the best ofmy knowledge, the Florida law went unopposed.
54. See in/fh Part I1.
5. 2001 Bill Text CT S.B. 377 (version March 7, 2001), available at lhttp://wwwv.lexis.com.
56. Id.
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not defined in the bill, is interpreted. My sense is that interpreting the
term "apology" to cover an admission of fault contained within the
apology is the most plausible reading.) Note too that, unlike most of the
other laws and bills discussed above, the language of this bill explicitly
speaks in terms of "apologies" and not in terms of expressions of
"sympathy" and "benevolence. ' 5
Hawaii's proposed legislation goes further than Connecticut's.
Hawaii's bill ("Apologies") provides:
Evidence of written or oral apologies issued by or on behalf of an
individual, corporation, or government entity, whether made before
or during legal or administrative proceedings relating to the subject
matter of the apology, is not admissible to prove liability. Evidence of
benevolent gestures made in connection with such apologies is likewise
not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable or admissible merely because it is
presented in conjunction with an apology. This rule also does not
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose,
such as negativing a contention of bad faith.5
Here too the most plausible, though not indisputable, reading of
Hawaii's bill is that an admission of fault contained within an apology
is inadmissible. 59 Hawaii's bill also appears to exclude apologies for
both intentional and unintentional injuries in civil cases, for there is no
mention of limiting conditions such as "involved in an accident" as with
Massachusetts, Texas, California, or Florida or "negligence" as with
Connecticut. Hawaii's bill is explicit, however, that an apology could
57. \Vest Virginia's bill is the one exception. See supl'a note 50.
58. S.B. 1477, 21st Leg. (Haw. 2001) (version Jan. 6, 200l),aailable at lttp://wws .lexis.com.
59. 1 do not read the third sentence of Hawaii's bill ("This rule does not require the exclusion ofany
evidence othenvise discoverable or admissible merely because it is presented in conjunction with an
apology.") as permitting an admission ol'fault contained within an apology to be introduced into evidence.
This third sentence tracks a parallel provision of FRE 408 ("This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course ofcompromise negotiations.").
See FED. R. Evil). 408. That parallel provision was "drafted to meet the objection [thatI a party could
present a fact du ring compromise negotiations and thereby prevent an opposing party from offering evidence
of that fact at trial even though such evidence was obtained from independent sources." HoUsi.'-SEN:VrE
CONFERENCE CoM\i.rr'EE RiPORT to FED. R. E\'ID. 408. In other words, it appears that the proposed
apology bill is not intended to allow% evidence obtained independent of the apology to be excluded because
subsequent similar information was also given within the apology. For example, suppose an injurer fully
confesses his fault to a friend (not the injured party) and subsequently makes a fault-admitting apology 1o thle
injured party. As I understand this third sentetce, the apology to the injured part)- would not prevent the
confession to the friend from being introduced. The fault-admitting apology itself, however, would remain
inadmissible. The apology could not be used to "immunize" otherwise admissible evidence. Note that the
second sentence of the bill distinguishes between an apology and a benevolent gesture, implying that the
former is distinct from the latter, most likely with respect to its typically ftult-admitting nature. This supports
the reading that an admission of fault contained within an apology would be inadmissible under this bill.
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be introduced into evidence not to prove liability but "for another
purpose, such as negating a contention of bad faith." This exception for
other purposes potentially creates a significant loophole to allow for the
introduction of the apology.6"
The bill's eloquent statement of purpose is likewise noteworthy:
While it is only civil and humane to apologize and offer sympathy or
other expressions of understanding to persons who have been harmed
in some way, the reality of lawsuits oftentimes prevents such
expressions of apology or sympathy from being made for fear that they
will be used subsequently as an admission of liability. Many people
will bring a claim or a lawsuit against another person or other entity
for the simple reason that there has been no apology or expression of
empathy. Particularly in our State, the Aloha State, it is regrettable
that members of our statewide community cannot reach out to others
in a humane way without fear of having such a communication used
subsequently as an admission of liability. This Act will allow such
expressions without fear of their being used against those who express
such sentiments to others.tt
As with the laws in Massachusetts, Texas, California, and Florida,
Hawaii's bill seeks to protect statements and gestures emanating from
humane impulses or feelings. Yet Hawaii's bill, which would appear to
exclude fault-admitting apologies, presents three related rationales not
present in these earlier laws: (1) to encourage apologies through
eliminating the fear that the apology will be used in court to prove
liability, (2) to avoid lawsuits that could have been prevented through an
apology, and (3) to foster an "Aloha" type of community, where, roughly
put, people feel a humane connection to one another. Consider the
Oxford English Dictionar,'s definition of "aloha": "a word that survives
from old Hawaii [meaning] both farewell and greeting, friendship and
love, hope and promise.
62
60. As with the final sentence to FIRE 408 (allowing statements made in compromise negotiations to
be introduced "for another purpose" such as "proving bias or prejudice ofa witness"), this final sentence of
the Hawaii bill could create a large "loophole" for admitting the apology. For example, ifa defendant who
previously had made a fault-admitting apology to the plaintiff were to deny his fault at trial, might the
apology be introduced not as substantive evidence of fault but rather to impeach? See infra note 130. 'For
a discussion ofanalogous concerns about FRE 408,see Wayne D. Brazil, Ihotecting the Confidentiality of Settlement
.Vegotiations, 39 HA.STINGS LJ. 955 (1988); Cobien,Adtising, supra note 1, at 1034. While the Connecticut bill
does not contain such a provision, a similar concern exists with that bill, for it only excludes apologies offered
"to establish culpability or state of mind." The Connecticut bill is silent concerning apologies offered for
other purposes.
61. Id.
62. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989).
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II. LAWS EXCLUDING EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND
BENEVOLENCE
Before addressing laws excluding fault-admitting apologies, let us first
consider laws excluding expressions of sympathy and benevolence after
accidents. Not only will this lay the groundwork for evaluating laws
excluding fault-admitting apologies, but laws that exclude expressions
of sympathy and benevolence are important in their own right.
Massachusetts, Texas, California, and Florida have passed such laws,
and no doubt other states will follow. Further, such laws avoid certain
problems that arise with laws excluding fault-admitting apologies that
will be discussed later.
To aid in this exposition, imagine a debate between two old friends
from law school." Ira is an Incremental Reform Advocate who
supports only laws that exclude expressions of sympathy and
benevolence after accidents. Flo, a devoted revisionist who prefers Full
Legal Overhaul (why tinker when we should replace!), supports laws
that exclude both expressions of sympathy and benevolence and fault-
admitting apologies in all civil cases. However, Flo opposes laws that
exclude only expressions of sympathy and benevolence, believing such
"half-step" laws do more harm than good.
Ira: Laws excluding expressions of sympathy and benevolence after
accidents from admissibility make good sense. First, such expressions
are only minimally relevant to the issue of fault. If I say to you after the
accident, "I hope you feel better," or send flowers to your hospital room,
that of course doesn't mean that I committed the accident. There's little
or no logical connection between such expressions and the issue of fault.
Second, the law should encourage, or at least not discourage, people
from taking such steps. Such gestures reflect the better part of
humanity. Our laws should give people the secure reliance they need
to feel free to make these statements. Third, these laws are a proper and
logical extension of FRE 409, "Payment of Medical and Similar
Expenses."6 If I can offer to pay for your medical expenses after an
accident, why shouldn't I be able to say, "I hope you feel better" or send
you flowers? The logic within FRE 409 of encouraging sympathetic and
benevolent gestures after accidents is not limited to payment of medical
and similar expenses. Such payments are a special case of a general
63. This dialogism is intended to reflect the complexity of the valid arguments that can be advanced
on both sides of these issues.
64. Rule 409 provides: "Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital,




class, namely, sympathetic and benevolent actions, including
expressions, after accidents. The proper place to draw the line is around
the general class, not the special case. Though there are more reasons
to support such laws, and we can discuss them if you wish, these three
reasons alone should persuade any reasonable person. How good it is
to see that Massachusetts, Texas, California, and Florida got it right.
Other states will no doubt follow their lead.
Flo: Your arguments sound appealing, but they will not withstand
scrutiny. May we take them one by one?
Ira: By all means.
Flo: You begin by asserting that such expressions are only minimally
relevant, having little or no logical connection to the issue of fault. Your
view rests upon a basic, and unfortunately all-too-common,
misunderstanding of evidence law.
Ira: How so?
Flo: The modern approach to relevance within the Federal Rules of
Evidence is a liberal, inclusive one. Rule 401 defines "relevant
evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence .... more probable or less probable [.]"-'
As the Advisory Committee Notes to that Rule so clearly state: "The
standard of probability under the rule is 'more ... probable than it
would be without the evidence.' Any more stringent requirement is
unworkable and unrealistic. As McCormick says, 'A brick is not a
wall.'
66
Ira: But what logical relevance is there between sending someone
flowers at the hospital and being at fault for the accident? Surely
sending someone flowers doesn't mean that you committed the
accident?
Flo: No, of course not. But that is not the test of logical relevance.
If it is more likely that someone who was at fault for an accident would
send flowers than someone who-was not at fault - and I assert that it is
- then that's all the logical relevance that's needed.67
Ira: But that is precisely why such sympathetic and benevolent
gestures should be excluded. If the jury learns that the defendant sent
flowers, it might mistakenly conclude that the defendant was liable.
Even accepting, arguendo, that there might be some minimal logical
65. FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
66. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee notes.
67. The chain of inference runs from the act of sending flowers, to the defendant's mental state, to
actual fault. Sending flowers makes it more likely that the defendant believed he was at fault (for people who
believe themselves at fault are more likely to engage in sympathetic acts) which in turn makes it more likely
that the defendant actually was at fault (for people who actually are at fault are more likely to believe
themselves at fault than those who are not actually at fault).
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relevance to the evidence, surely the risk of unfair prejudice must
outweigh it under Rule 403?
Flo: Rule 403 only excludes relevant evidence where "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger or unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]"'6 Here those risks are
minimal. Unfair prejudice? This is not a case where showing a
gruesome photograph will so disgust the jury that they can no longer see
straight. Confusion of the issues? Misleading the jury? No, this is not
some highly sophisticated, obtuse matter. Having a small degree of
relevance and being unfairly prejudicial are very different matters.
Jurors can rationallyjudge - and that's the key, the jury is capable of fairly
making thatjudgment - how much probative value to attach to the fact
that the defendant offered to pay the plaintiffs medical bills. 9 Surely
the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative
value here. If these new laws are to be defended, it must be on other
grounds.
Ira: You've missed my point. Even accepting what you've said
about relevance and prejudice, the weak probative value of such
evidence is relevant in assessing these new laws. I said before that the
law should encourage, or at least not discourage, people from taking
such steps. People need an evidentiary exclusion on which they can
confidentially rely or else they won't make such gestures and
expressions. They need full assurance. It's not enough to tell them,
"Don't worry, the jury will probably interpret your benevolent gesture
the right way." This second reason combined with the weak probative
value of this evidence justifies its exclusion.
flo: That is a more plausible position. I thank you for clarifying
your argument.
Ira: So you concede that these laws should be passed?
Flo: Not at all. I merely accept the validity of your last argument.
Overall, these laws should still be rejected.
Ira: And why?
Flo: Let me address your third point about Rule 409, for examining
it will reveal the basic flaws with these new laws. You said that these
laws were merely the logical completion - the general case, as you put
it - of Rule 409 which excludes the payment of medical and similar
68. FED. R. EVID. 403.
69. See MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 185, at 645 ("Prejudice can arise... from facts that arouse the
jury's hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence.");
CHRIST-5OPHERB. MUE-IER R&L\IRDC. KIRKIArRICK, E\?IDENCE§ 4.10 (2d ed. 1999) ("[FRE 403] expects
courts to distinguish between prejudice resulting from the reasonable persuasive force of evidence and
prejudice resulting from excessive emotional or irrational effects that could distort the accuracy and integrity
of the fictfinding process.").
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expenses after an accident. But language and action (here the action of
payment) are very different creatures. Language can be much more
complex and nuanced than simple actions like paying medical bills.
Accordingly, laws that exclude expressions of sympathy and benevolence
tread upon a perilous terrain.
Ira: I don't see what's so perilous. If the defendant is permitted to
pay the plaintiffs hospital bills after the accident, why shouldn't he be
permitted to verbally express to the plaintiff that he hopes he feels
better?
Flo: The nutshell reason is that half a loaf is worse than no loaf at all.
What happens if, instead of saying, "I hope you feel better," the
defendant had said, "I'm sorry that you are hurt, and I hope you feel
better?"
Ira: I don't see a problem with that. Clearly the second part of his
statement, "I hope that you feel better," is an expression of sympathy.
I would say that the first part of his statement, "I'm sorry that you are
hurt," is an expression of sympathy too. Any sensible person would
interpret it that way.7" It's certainly not an admission of fault.
Flo: I accept your interpretation, but can't you see the problem this
creates? Here the defendant says, "I'm sorry" to the injured party, and
we're saying that his statement is inadmissible, that it merely expresses
sympathy. But what if instead of saying, "I'm sorry that you are hurt,"
the defendant had said, "I'm sorry that I hurt you?"
Ira: That's a fundamentally different case. Now the defendant is
admitting his fault.
Flo: So it's okay to say, "I'm sorry," just as long as you don't say
you've done anything wrong?
Ira: That's the line.
no: Can't you see the problems this creates? Consider three. First,
these laws are a trap for the unwary. Sophisticated parties will
comprehend this line, but naive parties won't, and naive parties will
think they're apologizing "safely" when in fact they aren't. Relatedly,
the media will call these "apology laws." "Apology Now Safe!" the
headlines will read, when in fact they aren't. Second, these laws
70. See Rehm & Beatty, supra note I, at 129 (reviewing case law to show that ' judges and juries
understand that expression of s)mpathy, regret, remorse and apology are not necessarily admissions of
responsibility or liability."). This does not mean, however, that error never occurs. See Denton v. Park
Hotel, Inc., 180 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Mass. 1962); Giangrasso v. Schimmel, 207 N.W.2d 317, 318 (Neb. 1973);
Bonser v. Shainholtz, 983 P.2d 162, 166 (Colo. App. 1999) (all holding that the trial court erred when
finding defendant's expression to plaintiff that he was "sorry" about the accident or the plaintiff's condition
an admission of liability); State v. Canaday, 911 P.2d 104, 110 (Haw. App. 1996) (holding that the trial court
erred when it found the defendant's statement that he wanted to go to the hospital and apologize to the
victim to be an admission as the meaning of defendant's statement was "ambiguous").
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encourage evasiveness by sophisticated parties. It encourages the
sophisticated defendant to act as though he's apologizing, when in fact
he isn't. If the plaintiff understands what's going on, this can be more
insulting than if the defendant had said nothing. Remember Nixon's
non-apology for Watergate? ("I regret deeply any injuries that may
have been done in the course of events that have led to this decision. I
would say only that if some of my judgments were wrong, and some
were wrong, they were made in what I believed at the time to be in the
best interest of the nation.").7 Where you know you are to blame for
injuring another, telling that person simply, "I'm sorry that you are
hurt," rather than, "I'm sorry that I hurt you," can be worse than saying
nothing at all. It's insulting to merely express sympathy or benevolence
when you should be admitting your fault." Third, and this relates to my
first point, by passing laws like these we lose momentum from passing
laws we really should be passing, namely, laws excluding both
expressions of sympathy and benevolence and fault-admitting apologies
after injuries.
Ira: I disagree. Let's go point by point. You say that sophisticated
parties will "get it" and naive parties won't. I don't think that's true.
Most people can understand the difference between an expression of
sympathy or benevolence and an admission of fault. It's not such a
complex idea. What proof do you have that such laws are so hard to
understand?
Flo: If the misleading newspaper headlines are not enough,73
consider an example. I was recently visiting a website maintained by the
Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions -
hardly a fly-by-night organization! The website advises doctors and
hospitals about reducing the malpractice costs through decreasing
errors, better claims handling, choosing among various insurance
options, and so forth.74 Below is the advice they offer about whether a
doctor should apologize for an error.
[Q.] Is an apology after an adverse event treated as an admission
of negligence?
[A.] No.
7 1. Aaron Lazare, GoAhead, Sqv rou're S"Ty, PSYCHOL. TODAY,Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 76.
72. See Taft, swupa note I, at 1132 ("The kinds of expressions protected by statutes [like
Massachusetts's and Texas's that only protect expressions of sympathy and benevolence] are more akin to
botched apologies, apologies that fail precisely because of their generality. While sympathetic expressions
may be useful in a fender bender, they are more likely to exacerbate pain in situations of catastrophic loss.").
73. See supra text accompanying notes 51-32.
74. About RAIF & CRICO, at http://%www.rmf.harard.edu/about/index.htrnl (last visited July 6,
2001). Their foundation has "S480 million in assets and insures 23 hospitals with over 4700 beds, as well
as 431 additional insured organizations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire." Id.
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In Massachusetts, any statements, writings, or benevolent gestures
relating to the suffering of patients involved in an unexpected outcome
are inadmissible as evidence of liability. Even so, some types of
apologies are better than others. An apology that includes such words
as "I am so sorry that my treatment caused you harm" is
inappropriate.
A sincere expression of regret following a poor outcome or
upsetting experience, such as "I am sorry this happened" coupled with
a discussion about future treatment options can demonstrate an
empathic and caring attitude. Apologies can help to mitigate any
anger the patient may feel, and communicate that you will workwith
the patient to improve the outcome.
75
Talk about double-speak! Is a doctor's apology admissible to prove
negligence? "No," they say. Sure, the next sentence, "In
Massachusetts, any statements, writings, or benevolent gestures relating
to the suffering of patients involved in an unexpected outcome are
inadmissible as evidence of liability," is technically right. But don't you
think a doctor reading this might mistakenly conclude that it's okay to
go ahead and admit his fault when apologizing? Isn't admitting one's
fault, after all, the core of apologizing? This law is just a set-up for the
unwary. Note too that Massachusetts enacted this law some fifteen
years ago. Time has not alleviated the confusion.
Ira: I see the risk to which you point. However, lawyers get paid to
help clients understand laws. Clients should rely on specific advice of
counsel, not newspaper headlines or website postings. You wouldn't
rely on some website if you were sick, you'd visit a doctor. The same is
true if you've injured another: you should get specific legal advice.
Your first point about these laws forming a trap for the naive has some
merit, but it does not persuade me. Your second point, in contrast,
about encouraging evasiveness - inducing people to say "I'm sorry you
are hurt" rather than "I'm sorry that I hurt you" - is fundamentally
errant.
Flo: Really?
Ira: Yes. Consider the two relevant scenarios: (a) the defendant is
unsure about whether he was at fault for the accident, and (b) the
defendant believes he was at fault for the accident. Let's start with case
(a). If the defendant is unsure about whether he was at fault, what he
should say to the plaintiff is "I'm sorry that you are hurt" or "I hope you
feel better soon." He should not admit his fault. Rather he only should
75. 100 Frequently Asked Questions about Health Care Risk Alanagement at http://www.rmf.harnard.edu/
rmLibary/faqs/featured/qw I/index.html (in the Adverse Events section) (last visitedJuly 6, 2001).
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express his sympathy, for by presumption he is unsure about the
question of fault. Don't you agree?
Fo: Of course.
Ira: In such cases, would. you object to a law permitting him to
express that sympathy without the fear that it would be used against him
to prove liability?
Ho: No.
Ira: Very good. Observe that this is a significant class of cases.76
Following an accident, it is often unclear who was at fault, and to
precisely what degree.
Ho: But what about case (b) where the defendant believes that he
was at fault? Why should the law encourage such a defendant only to
express sympathy and benevolence? Wouldn't it be better if the
defendant both expressed sympathy and benevolence and admitted his
fault?
Ira: Of course it would - but that's the wrong counterfactual! If you
want to debate which is better, laws that only exclude expressions of
sympathy and benevolence or laws that exclude both expressions of
sympathy and benevolence and fault-admitting apologies, we can do that
later. For now, however, let us consider these laws that exclude
expressions of sympathy and benevolence on their own merits. The
right counterfactual is the status quo under which even expressions of
sympathy and benevolence are admissible rather than an imagined
world where fault-admitting apologies are excluded. Suppose the
defendant believes that he was at fault, and suppose further that absent
any evidentiary exclusion he would say nothing. If we pass a law saying
that he can express sympathy or benevolence without fear of liability,
then at least he may do that much. Which is better, that the defendant
who believes himself at fault says, "I'm sorry that you are hurt,"
(ducking the issue of fault) or that the defendant say nothing? The
former, I submit, is to be preferred to the latter.
Flo: I complement you on the internal logic of your argument, but
I think you're seeing the trees and not the forest. What we really need
are laws that exclude fault-admitting apologies. You've almost said so
yourself. Why take the incremental step of excluding only expressions
of sympathy and benevolence when what we really need are laws that
exclude both those expressions and fault-admitting apologies? Why pass
"half a loaf' when what we really need is the "whole loaf'? If the
defendant believes he is at fault, the law should encourage him to fully
apologize. Surely that's to be preferred to inducing a mere expression
76. See Cohen, Advising supra note I, at 1048.
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of sympathy or benevolence, a partial apology as it were, which could
as easily cause offense as repair. Let's get it right and put our full effort
behind laws that exclude both expressions of sympathy and benevolence
and fault-admitting apologies.
Ira: I could not disagree more.
III. LAWS EXCLUDING FAULT-ADMITTING APOLOGIES
Flo: Why do you oppose laws like Hawaii's and Connecticut's
proposed bills that would exclude both expressions of sympathy and
benevolence and fault-admitting apologies from evidence? From your
earlier statements, I would have expected that you supported such laws.
Ira: Why do I oppose such laws? Why do you favor them? For
centuries evidence law has provided that admissions by party opponents
are admissible. A fault-admitting apology falls squarely into that
category. Indeed, what could be more quintessentially an admission
than a fault-admitting apology?" There is no more basic principle of
evidence law than that relevant evidence should be admitted. While
sometimes people who do not think themselves at fault apologize simply
to "smooth things over," generally speaking, is not a defendant's
apology extraordinarily relevant to the issue of fault? The burden lies
not on me to demonstrate why such bills are misguided but on you to
demonstrate why they merit enactment.
Flo: Very well. There are four broad, overlapping reasons to
support these laws. They encourage settlement and avoid needless
litigation; they promote natural, open and direct dialogue between
people after injuries; they express the culmination of the logic already
implicit in the evidence codes;78 and, perhaps most basically, they
encourage people to engage in the moral and humane act of apologizing
after they have injured another. There are other specific reasons to
support these laws. For example, I take issue with your assertion that an
apology is quintessentially an admission by a party opponent, as the
adversarial model presupposed by the admissions-by-a-party-opponent
doctrine is precisely what apologies are meant to avoid.79 But,
hopefully, these four reasons can structure our discussion.
77. Iflaws excluding apologies are enacted, cases will undoubtedly arise testing the boundary of what
is and is not an apology, which of a defendant's statements was included within the apology, and so on. Such
issues can be assessed best on a case-by-case basis. For example, most would take the words "I'm sorry" to
be strong evidence of an apology, but neither dispositive nor absolutely necessary evidence.
78. See Orenstein, supra note I (arguing for the evidentiary exclusion of apology using a feminist
analysis of evidence codes).
79. See injia text accompanying notes 135-37.
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Ira: Good. Let's go point by point.
Flo: Suppose a doctor makes a mistake in treating a patient. What
is the doctor to do? If the doctor consults her lawyer or her hospital's
risk management board, it is likely that she will be told to keep quiet.
"Don't say anything, and above all don't apologize, for it will just be
used against you in court."8 On the other hand, there have been some
top-notch studies of what leads patients to sue their physicians.
Researchers have asked patients. what leads them to sue their doctors,
and, if the patients are to be believed, a sizable fraction would never
have sued had they received an apology."' It's a vicious cycle. The
doctor won't apologize out of fear of liability, and it's precisely the
absence of the apology that triggers the lawsuit. The damage to the
relationship when their trusted caregiver, who used to be honest and
open, turns stone silent is tremendous.82 I'm not saying all lawsuits
would be prevented if there were an apology, but certainly some would.
Most physicians, after all, are not evil. The harm was caused by
mistake. Many patients can understand that. I won't deny that patients
are rightly angry about the substantive injuries, but many are also
angered by the doctor's intentional decision not to admit the mistake and
apologize to them."
80. Automobile insurance companies often give their policy holders similar advice. See Cohen,
Advising, supra note I, at 1012 n.9 (describing a card sent to a policy holder by his insurance company after
an accident, instructing him to "[k]eep calm, don't argue, accuse anyone, or admit guilt").
81. See Cohen, Advising, supra note 1, at 1011-12 n.7 (citing Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That
Piompted Families to File Mekdical M'Ialpmctice Claims Followinq Pecinatal Injuries, 267 JAN IA 1359, 1361 (1992)
(noting 24% of families suing their physicians following prenatal injuries did so when "they realized that
physicians had failed to be completely honest with them about what happened, allowed them to believe
things that were not true, or intentionally misled them" and a further 19% did so out of"a desire to deter
subsequent malpractice by the physician and/or seek revenge."); Charles Vincent et al., lity Do People Sue
Docto s? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking legal Action, 343 THE LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994) (detailing a
British study finding 37% of families and patients bringing suit may not have done so had there been a full
explanation and apology, factors more significant than monetary compensation); Amy B. \Vitman et al.,
How Do Patients I Ilant Physicians to Handle Mistakes"A Suney of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Settin 156
ARCHI VES OF INTERNAL N I ED. 2565, 2568 (1996) (explaining that in cases of moderate physician error, only
17% of patients would sue if the physician informed the patient of error, but if the physician did not inform
the patient of error, 29% would sue if later learning of error); Francis H. Niller, AledicalAlalpiactice Litigation:
Do the British Have a Better Remedy?, I I ANI.J.L. & Nl ED. 433, 434-35 (1986) (commenting on the much greater
role of apology and significantly lower incidence of malpractice suits in Great Britain as compared to the
United States).
82. For a poignant, in-depth example of the harm caused by the physician's and hospital's silence
toward a widow following her husband's death immediately after routine surgery, and the protracted lawsuit
that ensued, see SANDRA NI.GII.BERT, WRONGFUL Di'ATH: A MEDICAL TRAGEDY (1997).
83. Mindful of the liability exposure involved in a fault-admitting apology and the relational
breakdown that often precipitates lawsuits, doctors sometimes are advised to handle medical mistakes by fully
disclosing the patient's current medical condition and expressing sympathy to the patient, but not admitting
the doctor's fault. See supra text accompanying note 75 (describing the Risk Nianagement Group of the
Han-ard Medical Institution's advice); Lirry L. Veltman,Ataginglld Results, 46 GROUP PRAC.J.at 26-32
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Accidently injuring another makes one a klutz. Failing to apologize
makes one a jerk. It adds insult to the injury. It is that insult - that
relational breakdown - that often triggers lawsuits.84 Recall, after all,
that in the vast majority of cases involving medical negligence claims are
never brought.8 3 Apologizing after you've injured someone should be
the norm. The moral burden-of-proof falls on those who fail to
apologize.
Even if suit were not averted, in many cases, the settlement process
would be much swifter if the injurer apologized. After an apology is
offered, parties often strike settlements quite quickly. As Goldberg,
Green, and Sander write, "[at] times, an apology alone is insufficient to
resolve a dispute, but will so reduce tension and ease the relationship
between the parties that the issues separating them are resolved with
dispatch."86  Given that most lawsuits settle, the savings in time,
psychological anguish and money (e.g., lawyers' fees) through speeding
(Sept. 1997) ("lFollowing an adverse outcome the doctor should mieet as soon as possible with the fimily
and the patient .... At that meeting it is all right to apologize to the patient for the occurrence of the event.
'I am very sorn that this has happened.' (This does not mean apologize because you caused the outcome.)
A summary of the entire situation is in order. It is important that, at this early time, acceptance of
responsibility for a bad result may be unreasonable on the part of the physician. ... The physician should
let the family vent any emotions without getting defensive. Empathy is the key at this meeting and at all
follow-up visits. Make sure the patient knows what is going to be done, who will do it, how results and
progress will be communicated to them, and that you will be there for them."). See also Susanna E. Bedell
et al., The Doctor's Letter of Condolence, 344 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1162 (200 1) (advising doctors to write letters of
condolence to deceased patient's fimilies where, "[iln order to avoid issues oflegal liability, the letter should
focus on the sadness of death rather than revisit the clinical details of the illness.").
The assumption that under existing law a full, fault-admitting apology will necessarily be to the
apologizer's financial detriment can be challenged. See Cohen, Apology, supra note I and references therein
(noting a detailed study ofone Veteran Administration hospital's decision to fully assume responsibility for
errors, including providing fault-admitting apologies, which apparently worked to the apologizer's financial
benefit).
84. See LaRae 1. Huycke & lark NI . Huyeke, Characteristics oJ'Potential Plaint2 inA alpractiiebltion,
120 ANNALS OF INTERNALNIED. 792, 792 (1994) (noting that a poor relationship with health care provider
and impression of not being kept appropriately informed by health care provider significant factors leading
patients to seek legal counsel); AnnJ. Kellett, Comment, iealingAnyy I ounds: 7he Roleo oApology and Mediation
in Disputes Between Patients and Ptysicians, 1987 NMtss.J. DisP. RI.,O.. III,. 126-27 (emphasizing apology in
managing patient-physician disputes); Daniel W. Shuman, The P1ycholog of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U.
KAN. L. REv. 39, 68 (1994) ("When physicians are more forthright about what has occurred and assume
responsibility for it, patients are less likely to sue."); Orenstein, supra note I, at 263-74.
85. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to. Vgligence:
Results ofthe Hatward Medical Malpractice Study Ill, 325 NEW ENG.J. M lED. 245, 249 (199 1) (highlighting a study
of 31,429 patient records and finding that malpractice claims were filled in less than two percent of cases in
which injury-causing medical negligence occurred). See also PAUL C. 'WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF
NkIALPRAC.TICE: NIEDICAL INJURY, NIALPRAc-TICE LI'IGATION, ANi) P.TIENT COlPENSrI-ION (1993); see
generally Bryan A. Liang, En'or in Medicine: Legal Impediments to U.S. Rejbrm, 24J. HEALTH POL., Poi.'y & L. I,
28-38 (1999).
86. Goldberg et al., supra note 1, at 22 1. See also Kee'a, supra note 2; "On Apology," http://www.
transformingpr-ctices.com/qa/qa8apolorv.html (last visited May 3, 2002) (deseribing lawsuits %%,here an
apology was the pivotal step toward settlement, fundamentally altering the dynamics of the interaction).
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up settlements may well be greater than what's saved through
preventing needless lawsuits. Apologies can be the turning point in the
negotiations. Indeed, practitioners often report that apologies work
"magic" or "miracles" in helping to settle what seemed to be intractable
disputes.
Ira: Your arguments have basic flaws. However, before addressing
them, let us clarify a few issues. You say that many patients would not
have sued their doctors if only they had received apologies. Do you
have any precise numbers on this? And how can you know that they
wouldn't have sued if they had received an apology? Am I wrong to be
cynical and think that some patients say that they would not have sued
if they had received an apology, but really would have? If the doctor
amputates the wrong leg, even if he apologizes, you still need monetary
compensation! The same questions apply to settlement. You say that
apologies speed the settlement process. Do you have data supporting
this? Further, you've talked a lot about the medical setting. I don't
think it's fair to generalize from that example. The doctor and patient
have a prior relationship. Ideally that relationship is rooted in the
doctor's care for the patient. When the doctor fails to apologize, the
patient feels a betrayal of trust. Moreover, medical ethics dictate that
doctors should fully inform patients, including disclosing when the
doctor has made a mistake.88 If a stranger drives his car into mine and
doesn't apologize, I might care, but I don't think I would care about the
lack of apology nearly as much as the patient who feels betrayed.
There's no general rule of ethics that an injurer must inform the injured
of everything he knows.
Flo: Your questions are good ones, and I appreciate your raising
them. It is impossible to know with perfect certainty what fraction of
patients would not have sued if they had received an apology. Some
skepticism is warranted. When a patient says that he would not have
sued if he had received an apology, you can never know for sure what
he would have done if he had. But surely some patients can be taken at
their word. Doctors have a very strong incentive to figure out what
leads patients to sue them, and the studies I've seen seem well-designed.
I can't say for sure whether the percentage of patients who would have
forgone suit if they had received an apology is 5%, 15%, 25%, or
perhaps even 35%.8 But if the percentage is even half of what these
studies suggest, it is a sizable percentage. The same applies to
87. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1044.
88. See id. at 1012 n.8; Orenstein, supa note I, at 264-63; Martin L. Smith & Heidi P. Fostcr, A'Ioall
AIana(ing ledical AIisiaikes, 9 CAN 1IRIDGFI Q. oiF HEATHCARE ETHICS 38 (2000).
89. See supra note 81 (reporting percentages).
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settlements. I don't know of hard data that shows that after an apology,
the settlement process becomes, on average, X% faster. However, there
are countless anecdotes to that effect and a few snippets of data too. 0
There are also psychological studies demonstrating that apologies
decrease the injured party's anger and that people judge injurers who
apologize more favorably than those who don't."
As to your point about the need for apologies generally being greatest
when the parties have a prior relationship, I agree. However, many
injuries and lawsuits occur in the context of relationships: think of
family disputes, employment disputes, neighborhood disputes, and even
contractual business disputes. Where there is no prior relationship,
often the injury ironically (for this may be something the injured party
least wants) creates a relationship between the parties, if only to address
how to handle the injury. Even among strangers, the failure to
apologize can be deeply painful and offensive. Finally, as to the subject
of ethics, though medical ethics is of course irrelevant when two
strangers have a car accident, general ethics is relevant. Virtually all
moral or religious traditions would say that, where you've injured
another person, you should apologize for it. 2
Ira: I accept your points, but I want to get one thing clear. On the
one hand, you say more apology is good because it would avoid lawsuits.
On the other hand, you say more apology is good because it would
speed the settlement process. From the moral viewpoint, these are very
different cases. Where both an apology and a settlement occurs, I say,
"all is well and good." If the doctor apologizes and the parties work out
90. See Cohen, Apology, supua note I, at 1454, 1461 (describing marked savings in legal costs by the
Veterans Medical Affairs Center in Lexington, Kentucky and by the Toro Corporation following the
adoption of a policy of apologizing and assuming financial responsibility for injuries rather than denying
them).
91. The growing psychological and sociological literature on apology has been well collected by
Petrucci, suma note 1. For several of the finest theoretical introductions to the psychology and sociology of
apology, see ER\ING GOFF. IAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 113-18(1972); NIcHOLAS TAVUCHIS, \ lEA CULl'A:
A SOCIOLOGY OFAPOLOGYAND RECONCILIATION, atchs. 3,4(199) ("Modes of Apology"); Lazare, supra
note 7 I, at 40. On the role of apologies in reducing victims' anger, see Mary B. Harris, Mediatos Between
Frstration andA ession in a Field Etperiment, 10J. EXPERI.MENT"ALSOC. PSYCHOL 561,570(1974); Ken-ichi
Ohbuchi et at., Apology as Aggression Control Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Hanr, 56 J.
PERSONALrTY & SOC. PSYCHOL 219 (1989); Michael E. McCullough et al., InteIpersonal "nagiring in Close
Relationships, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 32 I, 323 (1997). Apologies tend to produce a moie
positive image of the apologizer in others. See Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note
40; Darby & Schlenker, Childnn's Reactions to Transg essions: Ejf4cts of the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse,
sutor note 40. There is some evidence suggesting that while an apology with an offer of repair is seen as
better than one without an offer of repair, the latter is still seen positively. See infia note 128 (discussing
research by Scher and Darley).
92. For references to religious literature on apology and forgiveness, see Cohen, Adrising, supra note
1, at 1021 n.3 I. See also REPE.rANCE: A CO.MPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Camey
eds., 1997).
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a settlement in which the doctor, or more typically her insurance
company, compensates the patient, then the patient has received
compensation for his injury. But if the doctor makes a mistake that
causes harm to the patient, apologizes, and the patient forgoes suit, I
don't see why that should be lauded. Where damage has occurred, an
apology alone is inadequate compensation. The offender should both
apologize and pay compensation for the injury.
Fo: I see your point, however, I disagree. If the injured party wants
to forgo suit following the apology, who are we to say that he has made
the wrong decision? A student told me that several years ago her
grandmother received negligent medical treatment that left her unable
to walk without great discomfort. The doctor who erred came to the
grandmother and apologized fully. Despite the urgings of her family
and friends, from that point on, the grandmother decided to forgo suit.
"I'm a Christian," she said. "When a person asks me to forgive them,
I do. ,93
Ira: But surely there are different meanings to forgiveness. Isn't the
right thing for the grandmother to do to forgive the doctor in the sense
of ceasing her anger toward him, but not to forgive the debt of monetary
compensation the doctor owes her? What will she do if later she needs
money to pay for services she can no longer perform for herself because
of the doctor's error?
lo: That's not how the grandmother saw it, and isn't it the
grandmother's view that matters? You may think that the critical issue
is whether the injurer took fiscal responsibility. The grandmother cared
primarily about whether the injurer admitted her moral responsibility.
Apologies can help avoid lawsuits for reasons other than such strong
notions of forgiveness. Sometimes the substantive harm is minor, and
the patient feels the apology is adequate. Some patients sue because of
what they perceive as the doctor's arrogance in not telling them what
93. This example was told to the Author by a student. One question this example implicitly raises
is whether it is appropriate fbr an offender to ask for forgiveness. If one were truly sorry, one 4ould be
expected to apologize for what has done. Should one ask to be released from-forgiven for-the shame of
what one has done? Seeing forgiveness as the injured party's perogative, rather than as the injured party's
burden, may be particularly important for serious injuries. As Minow writes of South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission,
[IT]he survivors recoil when perpetrators greet victims with open arms and handshakes. In
these cases, forgiveness is assumed, rather than granted. A survivor may think, "should you
not wait for me to stretch out my hand to you, when I'm ready, when I've established what
is right?" Forgiveness is a power held by the victimized, not a right to be claimed. The
ability to dispense, but also to withhold, forgiveness is an ennobling capacity and part of the
dignity to be reclaimed by those who sunive the wrongdoing .... To expect survivors to
forgive is to heap yet another burden on them.
N linow, suprm note 1, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
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happened. Some patients sue because they're concerned that the
mistake that happened to them will happen to someone else, and until
the doctor or hospital admits the mistake to the patient, the patient fears
the doctor or hospital hasn't really faced the mistake. There are lots of
reasons an apology may cause the injured party to forgo suit.
Ira: I accept your points, but I don't think you can brush off my
criticism so easily. Even if this particular grandmother wanted to forgo
compensation, why should the law encourage apologies without compensation? If
the injurer is truly sorry, shouldn't he pay for what he has done?' You say that
these laws promote "natural, open and direct dialogue between people
after injuries." I don't see it that way at all. What these laws do is
promote insincere apologies between people. They cheapen the
meaning of an apology. If a person who has the resources isn't willing
to pay compensation when apologizing, then he's not really remorseful.
He's apologizing, but he's not putting his neck on the line. If the injured
party wants to forgive the debt owed as the grandmother did, so be it.
But that should be the injured party's prerogative. The law should not
set that as a default.
Can't you see your mistake my friend? You see the power of what
one might call the sacred object of apology and think, "why should this
object only be used on special occasions? Let's use it more often." But
the object is only sacred - the apology is only powerful - because it is
reserved for special uses. No one would derive cheer if Christmas trees
were erected every month: it's because they're lit only once a year that
their symbolism works. The power of an apology lies in its integrity, and
that integrity is assured only because the law attaches consequences to
94. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1067 ("Some may feel that 'safe' apologies are duplicitous:
If you are rea/ly sorry, should you not be willing to pay for what you have done?... Many may think that
if you are unwilling to 'put your money where your mouth is' you arc insincere. As Wagatsuma and Rosct
argue, 'An apology without reparation is a hollow form, at least when the injured person has suffered a clear
economic loss and when the actor has the capacity to make compensation.') (citation omitted). See also Taft,
supra note 1, at 1156 ("if apology is to be authentic, the offender must clearly admit his wrongdoing; he must
truly repent if the apology is to be considered a moral act. When an offender says, 'I'm sortr,' he must be
willing to accept all of the consequences-legal and otherwise-that flow from his violation. Ifa person is truly
repentant, he will not seek to distance himself from the consequences that attach to his action; rather, he
will accept them as a part of the performance of a mord act and the authentic expression of contrition.").
Responding to Taft's argument, Linda Ross Meyer observed that the legal consequences that attach to an
apology are in part a matter ofsocial construction, and hence ofpolicy choice. Linda Ross Meyer, Remarks
at Yale-Quinnipeac Dispute Resolution Colloquium (Dec. 12, 2000).
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apologizing. 5 To use a British phrase, laws that would exclude
apologies from admissibility are "too clever by half."
Flo: Your points are important, and we shall discuss them. But first
let me make a preliminary point on which I hope we will agree. If we
enact laws excluding apologies from proof of liability, nothing prevents
an injurer who wants to apologize and offer compensation from doing so.
Put differently, if, as you've defined it (and I will take issue with that
definition later) a "sincere apology" means both the verbal statement
and the offer of compensation, a law that excludes apologies from proof
does not preclude sincere apologies.
Ira: Yes. That is true. But my concern was not with sincere
apologies, but with insincere ones. Why is it that our law should
encourage insincere apologies?
Flo: I will respond to your question in several stages. Earlier I
mentioned a second reason to exclude apologies, namely, to promote
dialogue after injuries. There is a natural, human way of dealing with
injuries: talking directly with the other person about what has
happened. Apologies are a key part of those conversations. By allowing
apologies to be admitted in court, our laws inhibit that natural dialogue.
Instead of people talking with one another directly after injuries, in our
culture all too often they begin by or soon start talking through lawyers.
The fact that apologies can be used as proof in court inhibits people
from entering that human dialogue, that human encounter. And that's
precisely when disputes escalate. The issue is not the sinceriy or insincerit of
the apology, as you call it, but whether that dialogue takes place.
I too am concerned with the quality of apologies: I don't think people
should apologize insincerely. However, I am also concerned with the
level or quantity of apologies. The world of apology, and of dialogue
more generally, is not black and white. Sometimes the injurer intends
to apologize ahead of time. Sometimes injurers who did not intend to
apologize when entering a conversation end up apologizing during the
conversation. Sometimes the act of apologizing helps to generate the
remorse. 96; Sometimes fault is crystal clear, and sometimes it is deeply
ambiguous. Some apologies are full-blown assumptions of responsibility
and some are only partial statements. The critical issue is whether,
95. See a1so Vagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 496 ("[1]t would seem to invite manipulative and
insincere behavior by wrongdoers if the law were to adopt a lirm rule that relieved them of liability if they
apologize."); Taft, supa note I, at 1153-54 ("[Tjhose who favor the creation of 'safe harbors' [i.e., laws
excluding apologies from admissibility] miss the mark. Injoining the growing chorus who Asant to blame
the system, they fail to see that what they consider systemic impediments to the performance of apology are
actually safeguards of the moral integrity of the act.").
96. See E. Tory Higgins & William S. Rholes, "Saving is Believing": Efects of Message Modi/icaion of
Memory and Liking.Jr the Person Described, 14J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 363 (1978).
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within our world of gray, the apology, and hence the conversation, takes
place.
Think, by way of analogy, of the confidentiality privileges that attach
to mediations. Suppose someone argued that statements made in
mediation should not be privileged, for all privileging such statements
does is protect lies made within mediation, for if people are telling the
truth, there's no reason to have such a privilege.97 The purpose of laws
excluding statements made in mediation from evidence is not so people
will feel free to lie within mediation. Rather, the purpose is to facilitate
a conversation between the parties, a conversation that can help them
transform the dynamic between them, which could help them resolve
the dispute. Ifyou don't have the privilege, the conversation may never
take place. The same applies to apology: if apology isn't privileged,
many apologies will never occur, but ifwe create the privilege, then they
may.9
8
Ira: Your analogy is off point. Absent a mediation privilege, many
parties would have no dialogue. This is true. The mediation privilege,
however, is designed to protect true or sincere dialogue, and the fact
that some false or insincere dialogue slips in is a price we must pay. But
this is not the case with an apology privilege. All an apology privilege
does is protect people who want to apologize insincerely, for if they were
sincere, they would be willing to have their apology used against them.
Unlike you, I care deeply about the quality of the apologies that are
offered. I'd much rather see a few sincere apologies than a plethora of
half-baked ones. Apologizing should be a serious, meaningful act.
When I start to think of all the meaningless public "apologies" I've
heard, I feel sick.99 Comedian George Burns once quipped, "[t]he
secret to success is sincerity. If you can fake that, you've got it made." '
Feigning sincerity may be critical for acting, but it should not be a goal
of public policy.
Flo: I don't think you get my point. I believe that there are many
remorseful people who don't apologize because of the current legal
97. For such a critique of blanket mediation privileges, see Eric D. Green, A Hereical View of the
Mediation Privilge, 2 OHIO ST. J. oN DISP. RESOL. I, 29 (1986) ("[Blanket mediation privileges are
problematic because they contain] no exception for bad faith, illegal conduct, fraud, or any other abuse of
the mediation process.").
98. Even if apologies are privileged, some injurers may still refrain from apologizing for strategic
reasons. For example, an injured party who receives a fault-admitting apology may harden his stance - for
now he is positive that he is in the right -- and insist upon a high level of settlement. Knowing this, even if
apology is privileged, some injurers may still refrain from apologizing.
99. For references, see Cohen, Adising, supia note 1, at 1017 n.23.
100. I have found no precise citation to Burns's quotation. However, there are numerous attributions
of this quotation and minor variations of it to Burns.
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regime - and that doesn't mean they're not truly remorseful. When the
risk management board of the hospital says to the doctor "don't
apologize," the doctor won't. If a driver receives a card from his
insurance company saying not to admit his fault if he's in an accident,
he won't. They may be quite remorseful, but it's the insurance
company that is calling the shots.''
This is true even where there is no third party controlling the purse
strings. Our culture, especially our legal culture, is tremendousy focused on denial.
If you've caused injury to another person and go see a lawyer, the initial
focus is almost always on whether you can deny it, whether the lawyer
can "get you off." Lawyers regularly instruct their clients to admit
nothing, especially their fault, because of the liability risk. If a
remorseful client wants to speak with the other party directly, his lawyer
will often advise him not to. "I know you may think you are partly at
fault for the accident," the lawyer might say. "However, if you
apologize, there's a chance the jury will take your statement to mean
that you are completely at fault. Remember that what it means to be
morally at fault and legally at fault are very different things. You may.
think you are at fault, but that doesn't mean you are legally at fault. If
at some later point you want to say something like an apology, that of
course is up to you. But I wouldn't recommend beginning that way.
Let me (the lawyer) do the talking for now."
Upon encountering the legal system, a person who is naturally
inclined to apologize often will be implicitly or explicitly told not to.
Once the pattern of silence and denial sets in, it can become difficult to
break. Hostilities escalate. The combative view becomes self-fulfilling.
Embracing apology is really part of a broader social movement to
treat others with respect and directly take responsibility for one's
actions.0 2 Think, for example, of other cultures like Japan. °3 If an
I 0!. See Orenstein, supra note 1, at 260 ("Many malpractice insurers aflirmatively 'instruct doctors not
to admit fault to patients without consulting the company or their hospital's lawyer.' According to one
medical academic, 'IT]he message is very' clear from insurers that even in the case of an obvious mistake,
the doctor should retreat from the patient and do all his communicating through his lawyer.") (footnotes
omitted). Additionally, the insured has a contractual obligation to the insurer to cooperate in the defense
of the claim. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1023-28.
102. Flo might also point to the recent rise of public, political apologies. See supra note 16.
103. For references to the literature onjapan apology, see Wagatsuma & Rosett,supra note I (on legal
dimensions); JAPANESE APOLOGY ACROSS DISCIPLINES (Naomi Sugimoto ed., 1999) (on psychological,
sociological, and literary dimensions). See alfoJohn 0. Haley, Comment: The Implications of Apolog, 20 LAw
& SOC'Y REV. 499(1986); Robert B. Leflar, Personal Injur Compensation Systems in Japan: Values Advanced and
Values Undertnined, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 742 (1993); Ohbuchi et al., supra note 91. For an introduction to
Japanese legal culture and attitudes toward litigation, seeJOHN HENRY N I',RRYMAN ET AL., THECIVILL.W
TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 692-93 (1994). For references concerning
apologies in other cultures, see Cohen, Advising, supa note I, at 1013 n. 10, especially Letitia Hickson, The
Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement. A Cross-Cultural Study, 23 ETHNOLOGY 283 (1986).
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accident occurs in Japan, the first thing that happens is that the injurer
apologizes. As Wagatsuma and Rosett write, "[i]n contrast [to
America], a basic assumption in Japanese society seems to be that
apology is an integral part of every resolution of conflict."'0 4 Indeed,
often both parties apologize, even when one is not at fault. °5 It's a
matter of respect. Japan also has a dramatically lower incidence of
lawsuits.0 6 It's hard for me to imagine these two things - frequent
apology and infrequent lawsuits - are unrelated. Or consider the
language Hawaii used in stating the purpose of its apology bill:
"Particularly in our State, the Aloha State, it is regrettable that members
of our statewide community cannot reach out to others in a humane
way without fear of having such a communication used subsequently as
an admission of liability."'0"7 What we need to do is move to such a new
cultural equilibrium where parties act upon their humane sensibilities
and resolve disputes directly rather than through lawyers. I take issue
with your Christmas tree analogy, and not just because Christmas has
become so commercialized and secularized that Christmas trees have
lost (at least in the Supreme Court's opinion) their religious
connotation.'08 Unlike Christmas trees, apologies need not, and should
not, be reserved for a small subset of injuries. They can and should
have much wider social use.
Ira: I am no expert onjapan, but from what little I know, and from
what little you've said, I am skeptical of your comparison. Japan has a
radically different culture from the United States. There is much more
homogeneity and much more emphasis on maintaining social order." 9
There are also far fewer lawyers in Japan, and they are extremely
expensive. 0 You've said that injapan apologizing doesn't always mean
104. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 462.
105. Comments Professor Niorishima, "InJapan, apology may mean an acknowledgment of guih by
the morally guilty. But in most cases, . . . it doesn't mean that we are morally guilty, it just expresses
sympathy and a promise to deal with this matter with sincerity." Discussion: The Japanese Eperience, 13 U.
HAW. L. REV. 757, 758 (1993). Hence, "[m]aking an early expression of sympathy would track the ven,
common role ofapology injapan, where, following accidents, speedy apologies that express sympathy but
are not at root admissions of fault are the norm." Cohen,Adtising, supra note I, at 1048.
106. See MERRYMAN, supra note 103, at 643 ("[Thejapanese rate of filing civil claims] is 18 percent
of the level of civil filings in Germany and only 42 percent of the lower level in Italy. TheJapanese rate is
a mere II percent of the filings rate in the United States.").
107. S.B. 1477, 21st Leg. (Haw. 2001) (version Jan. 6, 2001).
108. See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989) ("Although Christmas trees once
carried religious connotations, today they typify the secular celebration of Christmas.").
109. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 493 ("Apology may be given a lower legal priority in the
United States because American society does not place as high a value on group membership, conformity,
and harmonious relationships among people asJapanese society does.").
110. For example, in 1985 only 2.0% or 486 individuals passed the Japanese National Legal
Examination, in 1990 only 2.2% or 499 individuals, and in 1992 only 2.7% or 630 individuals. NIERRYMAN,
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saying one is at fault - it's more seen as a sign of respect. I have no
problem with expressions of sympathy and benevolence that show
respect. My problem is when someone would say he is at fault, but not
take responsibility. As to your point about Hawaii, I think that language
about the "Aloha State" is mostly rhetoric. I can't imagine values there
are all that different from the rest of the United States."' If an injurer
who has the means apologizes but is unwilling to pay compensation,
how can the apology be anything but insincere?
Flo: The picture is more complex than that. Why should we equate
remorse with the willingness to make monetary compensation?" 2 What
if the offender sincerely believed that money could not fully compensate
for what had happened, that whatever he offered, it would not replace
a lost limb? What if the offender were remorseful but also materialistic?
What if the injurer were poor and the injured party rich? Suppose a
driver who is poor mistakenly hits an expensive luxury car, knocking the
luxury car's rear bumper slightly askew. Suppose further that although
the damage is slight, it would cost $4000 to fully repair - one third of the
poor person's annual income. Might not the poor person be sincerely
remorseful for what he has done without wanting to give up one third
of his annual income?
Ira: These are interesting questions, but they strike me as esoteric.
Yes, there might be cases where injuries are ultimately
"uncompensable" (as with the loss of the limb), where people are both
remorseful and greedy, or where the fundamental morality of basing
compensation solely on the plaintiffs loss is problematic because of the
economic disparity between the parties." 3 The law's first concern,
however, should be with the basic, ordinary case where the injury is
supra note 103, at 887. American bar exam passage rates are dramatically higher. For example, the passage
rates on the New York State Bar exam for 1997-2000 were between 75% and 78%..XrS Law Schools'Bar
Evam Pass Rates, at http://www.nylawyer.eom/exam/schoolrtes.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2001).
Ill. Flo might respond by noting (1) Hawaii is geographically distinct from other states, being not only
separate from the forty-eight contiguous states but also composed of a series of islands; (2) Hawaii's special
experience with apology, namely, the 1993 apology by United States for the overthrow of the sovereign
Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893, see Yamamoto, Race Apoloqies, supra note 16, at 68; and (3) Hawaii is the only
state where whites (2 4 %) are a minority. See www.census.go%-/population/cen2000/phc-t6/tabO2.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2002) (summarizing data from 2000 census).
112. Wagatsuma and Rosett report, "[A]n offer to pay the damages or accept other punishment
without offering apology is considered insincere ... in the Japanese context." Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra
note I, at 462; "[l]nJapan a person too willing to pay damages may be thought to lack regret." Id. at 487.
113. qf Evodus 23:2-3 (Jerusalem) ("Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou
speak in a cause to include after a multitude to pervert justice: nor shalt thou favour a poor man in his
cause.") and Deuteronomy 1:16-17 (Jerusalem) ("Hear the causes between your brethren, andjudge righteously
between every many and his brother.... Do not respect persons injudgment; but hear the small as well as
the great[.]").
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compensable, the offender has adequate wealth, and so on. That's
where our focus should be.' 14
Flo: But even in this "basic" case, why must the conversation about
remorse and the conversation about compensation bejoined? 15 Why
must responsibility be equated with monetary responsibility? Why can't
admitting moral responsibility in words ("I'm sorry about what
happened. It was my fault") and taking fiscal responsibility ("I'm willing
to pay for the damage") occur in two separate conversations? Think of
the bifurcated structure of many trials. First, liability or guilt is
determined, and then damages and sentences are determined. We don't
need to have both conversations at once.
Ira: I fear you've succumbed to sophistry, my friend. The first
conversation about moral responsibility only has meaning in light of the
second conversation about fiscal responsibility. It's through the
consequences that the sincerity is established.
Flo: How can you be so certain? Cannot the injured party judge the
sincerity of an apology by the apologizer's demeanor, whether he truly
looks remorseful? It's not as easy to deceive others in face to face
conversations as one might think. 16 Sometimes it is when conversations
have "no consequences" that sincerity is clearest and honesty most
forthcoming. When strangers talk with one another on an airplane,
often their conversations are deeply heartfelt precisely because they will
never meet again. Because the conversation has "no consequences," no
one has an incentive to lie.
Indeed, some attorneys have begun arranging confidential "apology
meetings" between opposing parties in certain difficult cases. Even
though all agree that the apology is off the record, often the apology
radically transforms the dynamic between the parties, cracking the shell
of the plaintiffs anger. Some of these meetings occur prior to litigation,
and often lead to settlement. Others occur after the litigation is
completed. What is key is that, even though the parties intend that legal
liability will not attach to the apology, the apology still has meaning to
the injured party. Consider one powerful example of such an apology
meeting arranged by Attorney Rick Halpert:
[I had] a case in which a child was burned to death after the car in
which he was riding was rear-ended by a driver who was putting a cd
in her disk player. There was a serious question about whether the
child's father might physically harm the driver who caused the
accident. We felt that our client's recovery would be enhanced by
114. Flo might have responded that examining unusual cases gives us insight into ordinary cases.
115. See Cohen, Advising, supnla note 1, at 1067-68.
116. See id. at 1066 n.164.
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meeting the woman and seeing that the child's death had destroyed
her too.
We participated with the prosecutor in a plea bargain agreement
that called for her to accept responsibility on the record for the death,
and plead guilty (not "no contest," which is the usual result). We
agreed on the record that anything said in the apology meeting would
not be admissible in the ongoing civil claim. After the plea we had the
apology meeting.
Both sides were represented by counsel. Also present, besides the
defendant, were the prosecutor, the victim advocate from the
prosecutor's office, and the defendant's husband. Through her sobs,
the defendant told the child's father how sorry she was for the death
she caused. He told her how much his son had meant to him and how
painful the loss was. Then he said, "I cannot live my life hating you.
I forgive you." Everyone in the room broke into tears, and as we left
the meeting together he said, "I hope God will give both of our
families a way to heal through this.""' 7
Or think of the converse circumstance - all too common in our
society - where the injurer pays a substantial settlement, but admits no
fault. For example, Coca Cola just paid the largest amount in history
to settle a race discrimination class action claim, more than $156
million, but admitted no wrongdoing.1"8 A year ago the Adam's Mark hotel
chain paid $8 million to settle a discrimination claim over the racist
treatment of guests, but again admitted no wrongdoing."9 This is c 20
Moreover, that type of settlement, where the defendant pays money but
admits no wrongdoing, is the norm in most cases, not just race
discrimination cases. Companies like Coca Cola and Adam's Mark
don't pay that kind of money when they are innocent. What would
have been so wrong if they had admitted fault?
I know in some cases, defendants don't want to admit their
responsibility because they are involved in multiple suits with different
plaintiffs over similar issues. The Coca Cola settlement may have
117. "On Apology," http://ww%v%.transformingpractices.com/qa/qa8apology.html (last visited May
3, 2002).
118. Greg Winter, Coca-Cola Settles Racial Bias Case, N.Y. Ti'I.xs, Nov. 17, 2000, at Al.
I19. Derek Cat ron, Adam 's Mark Settled Discimination Suiti, ORLANDO SENTINEL, h jar. 22, 2000, at Al.
See also Settlement Text ("Defendants [Adam's Mark Hotels] have at all times denied and continue to deny
the allegations asserted[.]"), at http://www%%.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/adamsmarksettle.html (last
visited Aug. 8, 2001).
120. It could be asserted that three groups suffer from such settlements: (1) the injurer, who fails to
frankly admit the problem, (2) the injured party, for the injury itself is not acknowledged, and (3) the public,
which is misled (e.g., future hotel patrons have an interest in knowing Adam's Mark's true race telations
record). Where such a settlement is entered under a court's auspices, query whether the court's reputation
for truth-seeking is also tarnished.
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involved an element of that. 12' But I think the issue is much deeper. We
have a culture where, pardon the pun, we'd rather sugar-coat problems
than face them. Indeed, I think the public prefers crafty denials to frank
confessions. I think Coca Cola's sales would have been hurt more if
they frankly admitted to racism than if they played the formally-deny-
but-partially-admit-it-in-fact game.
Note too that when a law is passed saying that the apology is
inadmissible in court, it is not the injurer who says, "I'm apologizing,
but you can't use my apology against me." Rather, it is the state that
says, "he's apologizing, and you cannot use his apology against him."
The state is saying in effect, "we the state want the parties to have a
conversation about responsibility - a conversation in which the injurer
can express his remorse - without having to worry about liability. If
later the injured party wants to invoke the state's power to force
compensation, we will assist in that, but would prefer the path where the
offender expresses his remorse and the parties directly work out a
settlement."
Ira: Now I know that you have succumbed to sophistry. The fact
that the conversation has no consequences makes it meaningful? Surely
the case of the child who burned to death is atypical, for there appears
to be no question of who was at fault. You are upset over common
settlements like Coca Cola's and Adam's Mark's where, as per the
parties' agreement, money was paid and the matter was dropped? The
fact that the state, not the defendant, excludes such evidence makes a
difference? Cannot you see the obvious? If we pass these laws,
offenders will have an incentive to lie! Many offenders will reason as
follows: I might as well apologize, for I have nothing to lose. If the
plaintiff "buys it," he may drop the suit or settle on inequitable terms -
perhaps he has an overblown notion of forgiveness like the
grandmother, and, if apologized to, will forgo the compensation he
rightly deserves. If the plaintiff doesn't "buy it," so what? He cannot
use the apology against me in court. Apologizing will become a gamble
with no down-side.
Flo: Perhaps it is you who have succumbed to sophistry my friend.
You said before that the burden lay on me to justify laws excluding
fault-admitting apologies, for they would significantly change evidence
law. I see it the other way. Apologizing after one injures another is a
basic humane and moral step. Should not the law encourage it?
In most cases, people (both offenders and injured parties) are neither
so sophisticated nor so devious as you make out. Most injurers who
121. See Winter, supa note 118, at A7.
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don't feel remorse aren't going to apologize insincerely. Telling
someone you're sorry face to face when you don't mean it isn't such an
easy thing to do. Further, why can't the injured party judge the sincerity
of the apology? To the extent that the ethics of a protected apology is
an issue, the critical issue, as I see it, is whether the injured party
understands that the apology is "safe" - that it cannot be used in
court.'22 As long as he understands this (and if he doesn't, his lawyer
should point it out to him) I don't see a problem. If he wants to
"discount" the apology because of this, so be it. But such protected
apologies are still better than no apology at all. 23 We don't live in a
world of pristine morality where everyone rushes to take full
responsibility for the harms they have committed. We live in a second-
best world where many people don't. Within this second-best context,
exempting apologies from admissibility to encourage more apologies is
a step in the right direction.
Ira: Can't you see the potential for abuse here? Sophisticated
defendants are going take advantage of naive injured parties through
these laws. They'll issue apologies knowing that there's no real risk
involved, but naive injured parties will think these apologies are meaningful - that
they do involve risk. Injured parties will think the injurers are putting their
necks on the line when in fact they aren't.
Think about what an evidentiary exclusion for apologies would do
functionally: it would preclude the jury from hearing a piece of
evidence showing the defendant's guilt. And who wants to exclude such
evidence? Defendants. If these laws get passed, it will be because large
organizations such as insurance companies, medical associations and
Fortune 500 companies will lobby for them.'24 They'll say, of course,
that it's for good reasons ("to allow doctors to admit their errors to
patients when they make them," "to help us correct problems when they
arise," and so forth), but the real reason is to limit their liability. Think
of how alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms like binding
arbitration have been co-opted: powerful employers make employees
122. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1067.
123. See StevenJ. Scher &John N. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Sqy to Apologie? Effects of
the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26J. OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 135, 137 (1997) (containing a
psychological study showing that although an injurer's apology is seen as having greater value when it
includes an offer of repair, it is nevertheless seen as having positive value when it does not).
124. In this regard, it will be interesting to watch the future of the proposed legislation to exclude full
fault-admitting apologies in Connecticut, which has a strong insurance industry presence. Given the likely
opposition by the plaintifPs bar to laws excluding full fault-admitting apologies, the support of the insurance
industry - another powerful lobbying group - may be critical. A realist might claim that the future of these
laws will depend not upon whether they receive the medical community's support (which they likely will),
but upon whether they receive the insurance industry's support.
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sign contracts (of adhesion?) providing for binding arbitration of
employment disputes 2  and allowing the employers to choose the
arbitrators. Even when both sides jointly choose an arbitrator, the
employers are often repeat players, and the arbitrators know that if their
awards are too favorable to the employees then they won't get more
business. The rhetoric, of course, is that such arbitration is more
"efficient," but the reality is that to a significant degree, the employers
have "captured" the mechanism.
Flo: You're off-base. I agree that there is a risk that the injured
party might think that the protected apology means something other
than it does, but this is a limited risk. Further, the plaintiff's bar can
work to correct it. Once such laws are passed, plaintiffs lawyers can
and should instruct injured parties that the defendant has incurred no
financial exposure when offering the apology. The much larger
problem is the "vicious cycle" I described before, where the offender
wants to offer an apology and the injured party wants to receive one, but
the offender says nothing out of fear of liability.
Before impugning the motives of those who support these laws, you
might think twice about the motives of those who will oppose them.
Who do you think will lead the opposition? Clergy concerned that the
repentant, confessional aspect of apology not be compromised?
Psychologists wanting to protect a tool of healing from corruption? No.
It will be the plaintiffs bar, in particular trial lawyers. They'll say, of
course, that they're trying to protect the meaning of apology and the
integrity of evidence law. But could the real reason be that apologies
prevent lawsuits, thereby cutting into their business?
Ira: Will you at least concede that these laws could induce shallow,
insincere "apologies" by offenders who, though unrepentant, calculate
that they have nothing to lose and possibly much to gain by apologizing?
Flo: I concede that this is possible, though I am not convinced it
would be widespread. If the injurer is being absolutely disingenuous
when apologizing, then I too would be repulsed.'26 But the world of
motivation is usually not that black and white. Even supposing that the
law induced some injurers to offer half-hearted apologies, would this
really be so terrible? Which is better, that the injurer offer a half-
125. On the contracts, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lme Coil., 500 U.S. 20 (199 1). See also Richard
C. Reuben, The Pendulum Swings Again: Badie, W Vright Decisions Underscore Importance ofActualAssent to Arbitration,
DISP. RF.sOL. MAAG., Fall 1999, at 18; Derelopments in the Law - The Paths oJ'Civil Litigation: Vi. ADR, the
Judicia;y, andJustice." Coming to Terms with the AftematiLs, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1831, 1862-66 (2000); Jean R.
Stern light, Alandatoly Binding Aybitintion and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to ajury Tia4 16 OHIO ST.
J. oN Disp. RESoL. 669 (2001).
126. See Cohen, Ad'ising, supra note I, at 1065.
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hearted, "protected" apology or that the injurer say nothing?'27 The
right counterfactual in judging these laws is not that the offender
apologize and offer full compensation, for under these laws the offender
can still do that if he wants. Rather, the right counterfactual to think
about is that the offender says nothing. Which would you prefer if you
were the injured party: that (a) the injurer say nothing or (b) even
though you cannot use his apology in court and even though you are
suspicious as to whether he means it, that the injurer tell you he is sorry?
While most people would prefer receiving an apology that involves
financial exposure to one that does not, I think most people would
prefer receiving an apology that does not involve financial exposure to
receiving no apology at all. There's even some psychological evidence
supporting that view.12
Ira: At last we agree, and disagree. I accept that this is the right
counterfactual, but I don't think apologies without risk are preferable to
saying nothing. Why should the law encourage people to be deceptive?
Consider what will happen when your rule actually gets implemented
- when an injurer has admitted his fault in an apology, but at trial
invokes the "apology exception" to have the apology excluded. Can you
imagine how maddening this will be for the injured party? 2 ' The
127. Orenstein writes,
Obviously, not all apologies stem from noble motives. People may apologize to escape
punishment (as in criminal sentencing where expression of remorse can lower a sentence);
they may apologize to salve a guilty conscience; or they may apologize to preempt further
accusation or discussion of one's wrongdoing. But for an apology to be successful, the
wrongdoer must perform a crediblejob of faking regret, if not contrition."
Orenstein, supra note I, at 24 1. In support of the view that an even insincere apology can still have meaning,
Orenstein provides the following example: "As liberal Democratic Representative Barney Frank, an openly
gay politician who was recently called 'Barney Fag' by conservative Republican Representative Dick Armey,
explained: 'Very often, the apology is not sincere.., but you still want it."' Id. n. 104 (citation omitted).
128. See Scher & Darley, supra note 123. Using a scenario of a friend's failure to make a crucial phone
call in a timely fashion, Scher and Darley asked subjects to assess combinations of apologies containing and
not containing the following elements: an expression of remorse ("I'm really sorry that I didn't call you the
other day with the information"), an expression of responsibility ("I know that what I did was wrong"), a
promise of forbearance ("I promise something like this will never happen again"), and an offer of repair ("if
there is any' way I can make it up to you please let me know."). While their imagined offense is minor
compared to the types of offenses that typically generate lawsuits, and while the nature of the possible repair
for that offense is more indeterminate than monetary compensation typically at stake in lawsuits, their results
are interesting. Scher and Darley found that "[each of the four elements of apology] people use to realize
the speech ofapologizing have clear and independent [positive] effects on the judgments people make about
the transgressor .... However, the greatest improvement in perceptions came from.., the offering of an
apology, compared to no apology." Id. at 137. More specifically, while an apology with an offer of repair
was seen as better than one without an offer of repair, the latter was still seen positively. Id. at 135, 137
(Table II). This is suggestive, but certainly not conclusive, of thc view that an apology without compensation
is generally preferred to no apology.
129. Orenstein writes,
I recognize that there may be problems with apologies if they are used in lieu of fair
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injurer has admitted he did it and said he was sorry for it - and now he
denies it! (Even if the apology cannot be brought in to prove liability,
I think it should be brought in to impeach!3 ') And can you imagine
how this will damage public respect for our courts? Suppose that, with
the apology excluded, the plaintiff cannot prevail at trial. Can you see
what will happen? The offender admitted his fault in the apology, but
he'll go scott-free. What could more greatly tarnish the image of the
court? Yes, I'll concede that defendants sometimes do get off on
"technicalities" when everyone knows they are guilty because of rules
like the Miranda doctrine that exclude inculpatory evidence. While
sometimes the public loses respect for the courts when these rules are
invoked, at least they exist for important policy reasons. When the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination gets invoked,'' we let
certain people we know are criminals go free because we don't want to
live in an inquisitorial state where the police can use force to extract
confessions." 2 Here there is no such pressing justification. Further,
when evidence is excluded because ofaMiranda violation, the trigger for
the exclusion is the police's misconduct, not the injurer's misconduct. With
an apology privilege, the injurer would hold the key to making the
compensation, and if rich and sophisticated actors take advantage of poor unsophisticated
victims. Yet, such disparate power is nothing new, and an apology-even if a corporate
ploy-enhances quality of lifc. Under the current legal regime, corporations are discouraged
from apologizing at all. Though it might be maddening for a defendant-corporation to deny
in court what it admitted in an apology, the plaintiff on balance is better off-as are we
all-in a culture that promotes rather than inhibits expressions of apology and contrition.
Orenstein, supra note I, at 253. Taft rejects Orenstein's position. He writes,
Maddening? The plaintiff in the scenario Orenstein describes is actually in a worse position
because of the protection Orenstein's proposal would extend. Now, instead of suffering only
from the original injury, the plaintiff must suffer exacerbation of that injury by being forced
to prove fault in spite of the defendant's admission. This exacerbation arises not only from
the additional expense required to show fault but also from the additional moral indignation
the plaintiff must suffer because of.Orenstein's evidentiary exception.
Taft, supra note 1, at 1133 n.94.
130. Even if enacted, laws that would exclude fault-admitting apologies to prove liability, but that
would allow their admission for other purposes, such as impeachment, may be inadequate to provide the
protection needed for such apologies to occur. See supra note 60. While a court might (or might not) deem
that the probative value gained by such impeachment in discrediting the witness is substantially outweighed
by the risk of prejudice (i.e., the risk that the apology will be used as proof of fault) under FRE 403, if fault-
admitting apologies are to be excluded from admissibility, the safer route would be for legislators to provide
that they cannot be introduced for impeachment purposes. Similarly, it may be necessary to exempt them
from certain discover processes as well.
131. &e Christopher Slobogin, Il' V LiberalsShould Chuck the Ecsusionny Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 363,
436-437 ("[The exclusionary] rule probably does more damage to public respect for the courts than virtually
any other singlejudicial mechanism, because it makes courts look oblivious to violations of the criminal law
and inolves prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges in charade trials in which they all know the defendant
is guilty.").
132. Seesupra note 1,.
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI IA W REVIEW [Vol.70
evidence inadmissible. And where would the privilege end? Would not
the "fruits of the poisonous tree" also have to be excluded? Suppose
that, following the injurer's fault-admitting apology, plaintifFs counsel
were to ask the defendant in a deposition: "Didn't you tell my client
that you were at fault for the accident?" Could the injurer invoke the
apology privilege and refuse to answer that question?
These rules would not only cheapen the meaning of apology, they
would undermine the public respect for our courts. The admissions
doctrine has long been a pillar of evidence law, and for good reason.'33
Where an injurer has admitted his fault, it is senseless - nay destructive
- to preclude a court from hearing that evidence.
Flo: My friend, I respect your respect for tradition, but let us be
reasonable. Do you really think the admissions doctrine arose with the
case of apology in mind? Yes, an apology is an admission, but it is of a
fundamentally different nature than other admissions. The core
rationale behind the admissions doctrine is the adversarial one:
"Anything that you say can be used against you."' 34 McCormick writes,
"the most satisfactory justification of the admissibility of admissions is
that they are the product of the adversary system, sharing on a lower
level the characteristics of admissions in pleadings or stipulations."' 35
The root reason we allow into evidence admissions by party opponents
is not that they possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that
typically justify hearsay exceptions (e.g., when a person makes an excited
utterance, there is little chance he is lying), but because we envision an
adversarial model under which, roughly put, "if you said it, then you are
stuck to it. We don't want people changing their stories."'36
133. See Edmund M. Morgan, Admissions (s an Eweption to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 335 (1921);
Edmund NI. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. RE'. 181, 182 (1937)("Whether an admission is hearsay and
is received as an exception to the rule, while an interesting speculation, is hardly worth discussion from a
practical viewpoint. Certainly it is receivable; its reception is much older than the hearsay rule; it is an
unsworn, uncross-examined statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted in it; and often it hasn't
even an attenuated guaranty of trustworthiness. It stands in a class by itself; the theory of its admissibility
has not the remotest connection with the jury system [i.e., the distrust of the jury's ability to effectively
evaluate hearsayl and can be explained only as a corollary ofour adversary system of litigation."). For more
recent references on the history of the admissions doctrine, see Freda F. Bein, Parties' Admissions, Agents'
Admissions: Hearsay I Vohes in Sheep's Clothing, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 401-03 (1984).
134. MCCORIICK, supra note 1I, § 254, at 133.
135. Id. See also Morgan's remarks in Morgan, Admissions, supra note 133; DAVID F. BINDER,
HE.\RSAY HANDBOOK § 28.01, at 317 (2d ed. 1983) ("The real reason for excepting an admission of a party-
opponent to the hearsay rule is that it is an equitable thing to do, consonant with a search for the truth within
the confines ofthe adversary system. It seems only fair that a party should bear responsibility for an assertion
reasonably attributable to himself. If the assertion is not true, such party- is usually in a better position than
his adversary to explain why it was made and to produce evidence to contradict it.").
136. Or, if the party is to "change his story," the burden is upon him to produce the supporting
evidence. See BINDER, supra note 135.
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Ira: Well, shouldn't that be the case? Why should people be allowed
to change their stories?
no: The issue isn't whether people should be able to change their
stories. 137 Rather the issue is how early do we want to impose that
adversarial model of dialogue upon the parties. Think of the evidentiary
exception for statements made in the course of settlement negotiations
and statements made during mediation. The basic reason we have these
exceptions is to encourage people to settle their disputes through direct
dialogue rather than through litigation. Without those exceptions, they
would not talk freely and many settlements would not occur. The same
reasoning applies to the case of apology. By establishing a privilege for
apology, we encourage parties to settle their disputes privately.
Rather than the state externallyforcing people to take "responsibility"
for their acts - I use quotation marks for "responsibility" as being forced
to pay compensation is more accountability than taking responsibility -
these laws encourage them to take responsibility for themselves. These
laws shift the locus of responsibility from an external, state-imposed
judgment to an internal, private assumption of responsibility through
dialogue. These laws treat people like adults rather than children.' If
we hold that an apology is admissible, we are holding, in effect, that the
adversarial model governs from the moment of injury.
Ira: There may be something to your argument about the locus of
responsibility, but I remain unpersuaded. Some statements made in
mediation may be probative on the issue of fault, and some statements
made in settlement negotiations may be probative of the issue of fault,
but an apology exception would cover, and only cover, the most
probative piece of evidence available.3 9 The embarrassment to the
court and the frustration to the plaintiff of excluding that particular
137. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do, however, allow pleading in the alternative. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2) ("A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically .... A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless
of consistency ....
138. SegeneralyJEANPIAGET, THENIORALJUDC..ENI.'TOFHECHIID(Maljorie Gabain trans., 1965)
(describing moral development of children progressing from the obedience to norms and authority to
engaging in constructing the norms); JEAN PIAGET. SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES. 119, 172 (Terrance Brown
et al. trans., Leslie Smith ed., 1995) (emphasizing the need for respect and direct dialogue among adults).
On the role of respect in negotiation, see generally Jonathan R. Cohen, When People are the Mems: Aegofiafing
with Respect, 14 GEO.j. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2001).
139. As Wagatsuma and Rosett write,
[Tihe law of evidence in America is torn between the pull to encourage compromise
settlement of disputes by a process that is likely to include an apology and the countervailing
attraction to a common lawyer of an admission, that "queen of proof," which can be used
to prove the claim despite the hearsay rule and other artificial strictures that make proof at
common law so complex.
Wagatsuma & Rosett,supwra note 1, at 479.
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piece of evidence would be tremendous. Unlike these other rules, eveg
,
time the apology exception was invoked, there would be a tremendous
price to pay.
Note too the issue of the defendant's explicit or implicit consent.
Before mediations occur, the confidentiality provisions are almost always
made explicit to the parties, and both parties consent to those
provisions. In negotiations, that consent is not usually explicit, but it can
be fairly assumed: Both parties know that the reason they are talking is
to avoid trial by trying to settle the case. In the case of apology, this is
different. When the injurer offers an apology, the injured party'has
impliedly consented to nothing.
Flo: "Implied consent" is such a slippery concept. The term itself is
oxymoronic. Real consent is of course not implied. When people
negotiate, can implied consent to confidentiality really be assumed? I
don't think so. Even if one were to accept your argument that implied
consent to confidentiality exists within negotiations, the rationale for the
exclusions for statements in mediation and negotiation is not the consent
of the parties. What right, after all, do two private parties have to
preclude a court from hearing evidence? The privilege exists because
the state grants it, not because the parties agree to it. 4'
Ira: An interesting point. Yet I remain unconvinced. The probative
value of an apology is just too great to be ignored.
Flo: What then do you make of Rule 41 O's exclusion of pleas of nolo
contendere and guilty pleas which were later withdrawn in criminal
cases? Surely these statements have tremendous probative value from a
logical viewpoint. Even though a plea of nolo contendere does not
technically admit fault, we know that is usually a legal fiction. Despite
their enormous probative value, they are excluded in order to foster
settlements.
Ira: Another interesting point. However, the provisions of Rule 410
are well understood by lawyers who use them. In the economist's
terminology, it is a full-information game - the players know what a plea
of nolo contendere is meant to do. These exclusions apply to highly
stylized statements within the context of specific legal proceedings.
They are not everyday statements like apologies.
Flo: If the rationale of encouraging settlement doesn't persuade you,
perhaps the rationales behind the exclusions for subsequent remedial
measures and payment of medical and similar measures will.
140. See Cohen, Adrising, supra note I, at 1039.
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While the subsequent remedial measures exclusion can also be
justified on the ground of limited relevancy,' the "more impressive...
ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to
take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance
of added safety."' 4 2 If after an accident the defendant is allowed to make
physical repairs, why shouldn't he be allowed to make relational repairs?
An apology can help prevent conflict from escalating. Further,
apologizing involves admitting mistakes, and when mistakes are more
easily admitted future mistakes are more easily prevented.
Ira: Your comparison, my friend, is errant. The probative value of
an apology vastly exceeds that of a subsequent remedial measure. Such
measures may have some probative value, but it is very slight. There is
no great embarrassment to the court or insult to the plaintiff by
excluding them. Further, the safety issue invoked by the remedial
measures doctrine is very different from the relational repair you talk
about. The safety at stake is people's physical safety - erecting a higher
fence around the construction site. The physical repair invoked by the
subsequent remedial measures doctrine is qualitatively different from the
relational repair invoked by apology.
Flo: Consider another analogy: the exclusion of payment of medical
and similar expenses under Rule 409. The advisory committee notes
justify this exclusion because, "such payment or offer is usually made
from humane impulses and not from an admission of liability, and that
to hold otherwise would tend to discourage assistance to the injured
person." 43 Surely most apologies also emanate from humane impulses
- it is the moral thing to do when one has injured another. Similarly,
"to hold otherwise" would discourage people from apologizing.
Ira: Again, my friend, you overlook the basic fact that an apology is
an admission. Re-examine the very line you quote, "such payment or
offer is usually made from humane impulses and notfiom an admission of
liability.
,
144 As I observed when arguing for the exclusion of expressions
of sympathy and benevolence earlier, the payment of medical ekpenses
has very limited probative value on the issue of liability. An apology has
tremendous probative value. It is quintessentially an admission.
141. One ground is limited relevancy, for a remedial measure does not necessarily show negligence
at the time of the accident. "IT]he rule rejects the notion that 'because the world gets wviser as it gets older,
therefore it was foolish before."' FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee notes (quoting Hart v. Lancashire
& Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869)).
142. FED. R. Evi). 407 advisory committee notes.
143. FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee notes.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
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Flo: Why should we punish people who want to do the right thing,
who want to take moral actions? 145  Because subsequent remedial
measures make the world safer, we exempt those measures despite their
probative value. Because paying the injured party's medical bills is a
humane act, we exempt it from admissibility. Perhaps the most basic
reason to exclude apologies is also the most persuasive: The law should
not punish people for taking a moral step.
Consider an analogy. Legal tradition has long recognized what is
often called the priest-penitent privilege.146 It has ancient roots147 and
has been enacted in different forms in all fifty states by statute. 48 The
paradigm case runs like this. Suppose a person who has committed a
wrong is also follower of a religion, such as Catholicism, that requires
him to confess to his clergyperson. Would it be right to let his confession
be used against him in court? The law has long declared that, despite
being an admission, such a confession is inadmissible in court. In part,
this legal doctrine stems from the law's recognition of the psychological
value of such confessions, however, the ultimate root is probably
religious in nature, that a person should not be punished for following
the dictates of his religion.
41
Now consider the case where, instead of being required to make
confession to a priest, the person's religion, or perhaps more simply his
143. See Orenstein's commentary on FRE 407 and 408: "IA]justification for [these rules] arises from
a desire to reward goodness .... We do not want to punish the 'blessed peacemakers[.]' ... We certainly
do not want to disadvantage individuals who do the right thing." Orenstein, supa note I, at 235-36.
Orenstein applies similar logic to the case ofapology: "[By exemption apologies, pleople who apologize will
feel more protected; they may still be sued, but their kind, heartfelt apology could not be used against them
in court." Id. at 254. See also Cohen, Advising, supra note 1, at 1067 n. 167 ("There is also an ethical challenge
to an injured party who would use the offender's apology against the offender in court. Ifthe offender has
come in good faith to settle the dispute, is it wrong for the injured party to use the apology to the offender's
harm?"). See also supra note 40 (noting both case law and psychological research reflect the judicial impulse
to reward rather than punish an apologizer).
' An intriguing example of wanting to encouragc injurers to "do the right thing" and repent from
their actions comes fromjewish law, where, ifa robber voluntarily wishes to return what he stole, the person
robbed is discouraged from accepting it back. See HANINA BEN-NIENAHEM, SELECTED TOPICS INJEWISH
LAW, V. 3, L.\\V AND EQUITY INJEWISH L\V 25-26(Shumel \Vosner trans., Hanina Ben-Menahem & Neil
S. Hecht eds., 1993)(citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BA\ KAMA 94b). Note, however, that this "does not
nullify the robber's liability to make restitution, and it does not forbid the plaintiff from accepting
restitution." Id. at 26. Comments Ben-Menalm, "ITjhe legal right conflicts ssith the public interest of
reforming criminals by encouraging repentance. Accepting compensation would raise the expectations of
conduct front those who wished to repent, and this may deter others who cannot afford to make amends."
Id.
146. See NMCCORMICK, supra note 15, at § 76.2.
147. See N lichaelJ. Nllazza, Siould Cleigy Hold 77e Piest-Penient Psivikge? 82 N .. RQ. L. RE\'. 171, 174-78
(1998).
148. See NICCORMICK, supra note 15, at § 76.2;Julie Ann Sippel, Comment, Priest-Penitent Privilege
Slaluts: Duatl t"otecion in the con/tssional,43 CA rH. U. L. R'v. 1127,1 133-36 (1994) (survc ying states' stat utes).
149. See I\CCORMICK, suput note 15, at § 76.2.
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conscience, requires him to apologize to the person he has harmed. For
example, within Judaism, a person is required not to confess his action
to rabbi, but rather to reconcile with the person he has harmed.1'5 If the
law is to exempt a confession made to a priest, should it not also exempt
the apology made to the injured party?
Ira: You draw an interesting but flawed analogy. In the case of a
confession to a priest, both the penitent and the priest expect and desire
that the confession will be kept confidential. Indeed, within the Catholic
church, a priest who breaks confession faces extreme sanction.151 Where
the injurer apologizes to the injured party, the situation is different.
There is no expectation of confidentiality to such a conversation. Unlike
the priest, many injurers will want to introduce the apology in court.
Put differently, there is little cost to upholding the priest-penitent
privilege, for both the priest and the penitent inherently desire to keep
the confession confidential. In contrast, where an injurer apologizes to
the injurer, the cost is great, for there is no reason to presume that the
injured party will want to remain silent.
Flo: I see this distinction, but the lesson is deeper. Why should the
person be punished for taking a moral step? When a person apologizes,
he is attempting to heal the wound between the parties. He is doing the
humane, moral thing. If shrewdness would lead an injurer to remain
silent, and morality would lead him apologize, should our laws be
designed to reward shrewdness and punish moral behavior? The priest-
penitent privilege, like the subsequent remedial measures doctrine, and
like rules excluding evidence of payment of medical or similar expenses,
reflects a basic wisdom: The law should not punish people who take
moral steps.
Ira: At this point, my friend, we have come full circle. I don't
believe he is being punished by having his apology used against him in
court. I believe that if he is sincerely remorseful, that is what he will
want. If he really wants to heal the relational damage, he will put his
neck on the line when he apologizes.
150. See N IISH NAH YONIA 8:9 ("For transgressions against God, the Day of Atonement atones, but for
transgressions against another human being, the Day ofAtonement does not atone until one has made peace
with that person."). See also UNITED SYNAGOGUE OFANIERICA, HIGH HOIDAYPRAYER BOOK 206 (Rabbi
Morris Silverman ed. 1951); GATES OF REPENT'ANCE: THE NEW UNION PRAYER BOOK FOR THE DAYS OF
AWE 251 (Chaim Stern ed. 1978).
151. As the Fourteenth Lateran Council declared in 1215, "[for ifa priest] shall dare to reveal a sin
disclosed to him in the tribunal of penance we decree that he shall be not only deposed from the priestly
office, but that he shall also be sent into confinement ofa monastery to do perpetual penance." Mazza,supta
note 147, at 174 (quoting R.S. Nolan, The Law ofthe Seal ofConfession, in 13 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
649 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds. 1912)).
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Flo: Our time is growing short, Ira, and perhaps it is best for now if
we agree to disagree. At root, I think an apology exemption would help
avoid needless litigation and drawn-out settlements through raising the
incidence ofapology. It would facilitate human dialogue and encourage
private responsibility-taking. Most basically, it would encourage, or at
least not discourage, moral behavior. You think that such an exemption
would induce insincere, deceptive apologies and, when the exemption
is invoked at trial, anger injured parties and diminish public respect for
the courts. Have I got the essence of our disagreement right?
Ira: Yes.
no: Perhaps we are not as far apart as might initially appear. It is
the power of an apology to resolve conflict that makes the exemption so
attractive to me, and it is the powerful content of an apology - the
admission of fault - that makes you so opposed to these laws.
Ira: I think that's right as well.
Flo: As always, it is a pleasure debating with you.
Ira: For me as well. And I offer my apologies, Flo, if during our
conversation I got carried away with my rhetoric.
Flo: I don't think that was an apology, Ira. Even if it was, no
apology is necessary.
IV. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The apology legislation movement is in its infancy, and the
examination of these laws will likely continue for years to come. Let me
suggest six questions to keep in mind as this legislation develops.
1. What laws will be passed, and how will these laws evolve?
The movement toward apology legislation has not happened, nor will
it happen, overnight. Massachusetts passed its law exempting
expressions of sympathy and benevolence from admissibility in 1986,
and Texas, California, and Florida followed in 1999, 2000, and 2001
respectively. Though a number of states are now considering
legislation, including legislation to exempt fault-admitting apologies, the
spread of such legislation, ifit occurs, may take decades. Evidence law
revisions are not cutting-edge political issues. Further, if the history of
the ADR movement is indicative, these laws probably will not arise from
a declaration on high (e.g., through an apology exemption to the Federal
Rules of Evidence) but through a series of actions at the state level. We
may well witness variety and incremental experimentation among the
laws that are passed. Some laws may exempt expressions of sympathy
866
LEGISLA 77NG APOLOGY
and benevolence only. Some may exempt both such expressions and
fault-admitting apologies. Some may exempt only certain fault-
admitting apologies, such as when the apology was spontaneously
offered after the injury, or in certain areas of law, such as medical
malpractice cases.'l 2 In examining such legislation, we should frame
changes in a broad context. A supporter of excluding fault-admitting
apologies might initially think to decry legislation like California's that
excludes only expressions of sympathy and benevolence. However,
California's incremental step may encourage other states to take larger
steps. Should Hawaii's proposed bill exempting fault-admitting
apologies be passed, a critic of it may discover that problems arising
from implementing that law will lead other states to reject such laws.
The legislative path is uncertain.
One issue such legislation will need to address is whether such
exemptions should apply only to accidental, unintentional injuries or
also to intentional injuries. This applies both to legislation that excludes
fault-admitting apologies and to legislation that only excludes
expressions of sympathy and benevolence. The key question is whether
there are sound policy reasons to differentiate between these types of
cases. Does the morality of and need for an apology differ when an
injury is intentional ("I harmed you on purpose. I deeply regret that.")
versus unintentional ("I am sorry that you are injured. I should have
been more careful.")? Exploring this distinction is beyond the scope of
this article. Let me simply note that intentional injuries, including in the
extreme criminal cases, "up the stakes" in both directions. After an
intentional injury, the moral and psychological need for an apology is
greater, as is the potential "re-injury" to the injured party and
embarrassment to the court if an apology is excluded.
2. How will these laws affect lawsuit and settlement patterns?
Two of the strongest arguments for excluding fault-admitting
apologies are to prevent lawsuits and to speed settlements. 13 Yet
whether and to what extent such laws will have these effects remains to
be seen. Will laws excluding apologies reduce the incidence of lawsuits?
Will they speed the settlement process? Will they lead to different
settlement outcomes? For example, will plaintiffs come to accept on
average less monetary compensation if they have received an apology?
152. See Cohen, Advising, supra note I, at 1060-64.
153. Laws excluding expressions of sympathy and benevolence may also be supported on such
grounds, but are most simply defended for their encouragement of humane gestures.
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Also of relevance is how these laws will affect error reporting and
prevention. One might hypothesize that where a person or an
organization admits errors they will be better able to prevent similar
errors in the future. 4 This is an area in need of research. One not-
insurmountable, but also non-trivial, challenge to such research is the
private nature of most settlements. When a lawsuit is litigated fully,
there is a public record of the events. In contrast, apologies often lead
to "non-lawsuits" and private settlements about which data is more
difficult to obtain.
3. How will these laws affect those cases in which they are invoked?
One critique of laws excluding fault-admitting apologies was that they
could do harm in the cases in which they are invoked. A plaintiff who
knows the defendant is at fault (for the defendant has admitted
responsibility when apologizing) but cannot prove it'in court is likely to
be angered, and the image of the court may become tarnished. Might
negative experiences with the application of such rules lead to either
their repeal or their refinement?
4. How will these laws affect the meaning of apology generally?
One critique of laws exempting fault-admitting apologies is that they
would cheapen the meaning of apology by encouraging people to
apologize without financial risk. Will shallow, insincere apologies
become the norm? Will apologies made without offers of compensation
become meaningless? Will the lawyers offer the apologies rather than
the clients? Will we see fill-in-the-blank apology forms lawyers
download from their computers to apply in particular cases? If
apologies becomes more widespread, will they lose their meaning and
"magic"? What will happen if this piece of moral, religious, and
psychological parlance becomes a more common feature of legal
disputes? Will apologies lose their sacred, confessional value and
become a cheapened commodity, or will they achieve their ultimate,
practical meaning as a tool of dispute resolution?
154. See Cohen, Apology and Opganizations, Apra note I, at 1464-68. In this regard, apologies may play
a particularly important role where torts arise from patterns of conduct (e.g., harassment) rather than
accidents. Note, however, that accidental injuries too can have systemic roots, the identification of which
may be aided by open apology. Id.
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5. Will our understandings of dialogue and responsibility after injuries change?
Two broad social themes implicated by apology are the channeling
of dialogue and the locus of responsibility following injuries. The rise of
the ADR movement of the past several decades, in particular the growth
of mediation and the spread of principled negotiation and now problem-
solving negotiation, has shifted the model of dialogue between parties
after injuries from an adversarial, courtroom model of dialogue to a
more cooperative, direct model of dialogue. Apology legislation may
represent a further step in that direction. Rather than seeing dialogue
channeled through the highly stylized and restrictive, though sometimes
necessary, structure called litigation directed at persuading a third party
decision maker (i.e., the judge or jury), the ADR movement has
emphasized the importance of direct dialogue between the parties aimed
at private settlement. This latter form of dialogue may lead parties to
better understand the other party's position and thus develop richer,
more complex, and more mature understandings of events and of
themselves.
Apology legislation may also lead us to rethink our understanding of
responsibility. Under a traditional litigation model, responsibility - or
more accurately accountability - is understood as a sanction externally
imposed upon the injurer by the state. This is true in both the criminal
and civil settings. When the state imposes a sanction upon the injurer,
the locus of responsibility is external rather than internal. In contrast,
where an injurer apologizes, he assumes responsibility for the injury
himself, and then the parties will usually determine the settlement of the
case themselves. Note that one of the main arguments against
excluding fault-admitting apologies ("If the injurer were truly
remorseful, he would be willing to have his apology used against him in
court - he would be putting his money where his mouth is!") implicates
the linkage between taking responsibility in words versus in deeds,
between verbal and fiscal responsibility. Apology legislation may
change our understanding of that linkage. It is now typical for parties
to reach settlements where large amounts of money are paid, but where
no admission of responsibility is made. Perhaps apology legislation will
move us toward an equilibrium where the locus of responsibility is more
commonly internal rather than external and where accepting fiscal
responsibility and admitting responsibility become better equilibrated.
6. How will other societies address these issues?
Cultures throughout the world use apology. Apology's importance in
Japan is famed. We may have much to learn from studying other
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countries as well. New Zealand has been at the forefront in developing
criminal victim-offender reconciliation programs in which apologies are
often central, and many other countries, including the United States, are
implementing such programs. 55  One of the most unusual uses of
apology I have learned of comes not from the public sector but from a
small, private company in the not-so-communistic People's Republic of
China specializing in delegated apologies:
Mr. Liu, [the founder of the Tianjin Apology and Gift Center and] a
former lawyer with a long interest in psychology, decided that the
people of Tianjin needed some help apologizing, "as a way of relieving
pressure, reducing barriers and the many negative feelings between
people today."
The company's 20 employees, who deliver the apologies, are all
middle-aged men and women with college degrees who dress in
somber suits. They are lawyers, social workers and teachers with
"excellent verbal ability" and significant life experience, who are given
additional training in counseling.
"I think this work is very meaningful," said Zhang Xiuqing, 47, a
soft-spoken former teacher in minimal makeup, a white blouse and
conservative navy blue suit. "We all have our disputes, and we need
a place to go to think them through and help to resolve them."
The center has had almost 100 clients since it opened in August,
mostly estranged lovers and people mired in family or business
disputes. On behalf of clients, the apologizers write letters, deliver gifts
and make explanations.
The service worked for Mr. Song, the businessman, who was
happily reunited with his father after five difficult visits by the apology
company's representatives. But others remain a bit suspicious of the
idea.
"I'm not sure how long it will last," said Professor Zhou. "In our
increasingly commercialized society, people have the idea that you can
pay money to others to do your work for you, and that includes
apologizing.
"But if you are sincere, you should go and apologize by yourself."s 6
I am not eager to see an American franchise added to Mr. Liu's
company. Would it be called McApology or McCulpa, or simply a
"public relations firm"? There is little doubt, however, that
international comparisons can teach us a great deal.
155. See supra note 11.





The past several years have seen a tremendous rise in apology
legislation. This legislation is of essentially two types: (1) enacted and
proposed laws that exclude expressions of sympathy and benevolence
after accidents (e.g., "I'm sorry that you are hurt") and (2) proposed laws
that would exclude both such expressions and fault-admitting apologies
(e.g., "I'm sorry that I injured you. It was my fault."). Following
Massachusetts's lead, Texas, California, and Florida have recently
enacted the former, more conservative type of law. Connecticut and
Hawaii are now considering pending bills of the latter type. Other states
will likely address the issue in coming years. If enacted, laws excluding
fault-admitting apologies, such as Connecticut and Hawaii's pending
bills, could profoundly change dispute resolution and legal practice.
This Article has addressed the pros and cons of each type of law. The
main arguments in favor of laws excluding expressions of sympathy and
benevolence after accidents are: (1) the minimal relevance of such
statements, (2) to encourage people to take such humane gestures after
accidents, and relatedly (3) to complete policy goals already found within
FRE 409 ("Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses"). The main
arguments against these laws are: (1) such laws form a trap for the
unwary who would mistakenly believe that such laws exempt fault-
admitting apologies, and (2) such laws encourage evasiveness by
sophisticated injurers, viz., they encourage injurers who know they are
at fault to make potentially insulting statements expressing sympathy but
not admitting fault.
The main arguments in favor of laws excluding both expressions of
sympathy and benevolence and fault-admitting apologies after accidents
are: (1) to avoid litigation and speed the settlement process, (2) to
encourage natural, open and direct dialogue among the parties, (3) to
fulfill policy purposes already present in other evidentiary exclusions,
such as FRE 408's fostering of private settlement, FRE 407's
encouragement of subsequent remedial measures, FRE 409's
promotion of benevolent and compassionate gestures, and the priest-
penitent privilege's allowance of acts of religious conscience, and most
simply (4) to encourage people to take, or at least not discouraging them
from taking, the moral and humane act of apologizing after they have
injured another. Such laws might also trigger greater responsibility-
taking by injurers. Rather than a court externally imposing
accountability though a sanction, through apology the injurer would
directly admit responsibility verbally and would likely then assume fiscal
responsibility through private settlement. The main arguments against
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these laws are that such laws could: (1) induce insincere, manipulative
apologies from unremorseful injurers, (2) anger injured parties who,
despite the injurer's fault-admitting apology, could not prove the
injurer's liability in court, and relatedly (3) decrease public respect for
the courts when parties who have admitted their guilt when apologizing
are not found liable.
The debate over laws excluding fault-admitting apologies has just
begun. There is significant uncertainty about how these laws will
develop and what their impact will be. The legal "experiment" is in its
infancy. Some questions to keep in mind as we evaluate these laws in
coming years are: (1) what laws will be passed, and how will these laws
evolve? (2) how will these laws affect lawsuit and settlement patterns? (3)
how will these laws affect those cases in which they are invoked? (4) how
will these laws affect the meaning of apology generally? (5) will our
understandings of dialogue and responsibility 4fter injuries change? and
(6) how will other societies address these issues?
This Article has approached the topic of apology legislation largely
from a legal perspective by presenting some of the central arguments
supporting and opposing such legislation, as well as questions for future
research. However, I hope that the reader appreciates that more than
just legal considerations are involved. Apologies lie at a fascinating
crossroads of law, psychology, economics, culture and, above all,
morality. Apologizing when one has injured another is a basic moral
act, yet it is an act very much outside the traditional adversarial legal
framework. The new apology legislation may yield a greater
reconciliation between our legal system's emphases on denial, proof, and
punishment, and our religious systems' emphases on apology,
forgiveness, and the direct assumption of responsibility. How that
balance will be struck, how it will change dispute resolution and legal
practice, and how it will change our culture generally all remain to be
seen.
